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ABSTRACT
In my thesis, Evolution Science and the Imago Dei: A Richer and more Robust
Treatment of Theological Anthropology, the first chapter demonstrates, from the
historical analysis of the content attributed to the concept imago Dei over the centuries,
that different ages in the Church have interpreted the content of that expression in different
ways. From this historical analysis that the imago Dei assumes different meanings at
different points in history, I justify my expectation that the term is open to ever new
meanings.
With the second chapter, by exploring the evolutionary contribution to the
emergence of modern human, I establish the similarity and divergence between humans
and nonhumans, genetically and phenotypically. In the third chapter, I criticize the
exclusive reference of the imago Dei to only humans. Even though humans continue to be
special and distinct from other species, human species has a lot in common with nonhuman
species. Evolutionary science helps demonstrate that what our ancestors in faith thought
was unique to humans is not so.
My claim is that every living species is imago Dei in different ways. Every time
that there is similarity between species, there is imago Dei, and every time that there is
divergence, there is imago Dei in a different way. The divergence is not a difference
between members of the same species, or else there would be in the same species so
many imago Dei in different ways. Rather, the divergence is the speciation, that is, the
difference between species. Because we are all imago Dei, we have a purpose which is not
only individual, self-centered, or universal but which is divine; therefore, the meaning of
our life does not end in this life but is opened to eschatology. Because we are imago Dei, we
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are called to be in solidarity and to live in sincerity with each other. Solidarity, rather than
having anything to do with pity or charity, affirms that as imago Dei, we all have value in
the eyes of our God.

George E. Griener, S.J., Dr Theo., Director
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While the Bible and the Christian tradition use the language of
image of God specifically of the human, they also see the whole
of creation, and the diversity of life on Earth, as the selfexpression of God and, in this sense, as imaging God.1

General Introduction
Anthropological science, as the scientific study of human biological and
physiological characteristics (physical anthropology) and human societies and cultures and
their development (social anthropology), is often readjusted in light of new discoveries in
science. When discoveries or new scientific theories are conceived, it impacts in one way
or another the past and present comprehension of the human being. When Christians think
about the human being, they approach it with a theological anthropology perspective where
they explain man considering their faith, in light of Revelation and the Christ
event. Christian anthropology has developed variations on the understanding of the human
being as imago Dei. Might contemporary evolutionary science contribute to further
development? Understanding Homo sapiens as a product of a long history of evolution
governed by natural selection rather than divine intervention re-frames much of the
theological discussion. If the modern human is understood as a being which descends from
a common ancestor with other species, what can be the implications in the Christian
theological anthropology? What will it mean then to be imago Dei? Is it exclusively being
a human person? Does something or any feature belong uniquely or exclusively to human
beings? And how can we understand the strict reference of imago Dei to the non-physical,
the soul or spirit, reason or conscience, during history? This thesis will demonstrate that
the human person is so thoroughly embedded in natural physical processes that the concept

1

Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith: The Change of Heart that leads to a New Way of Living on
Earth (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 14.
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of the imago Dei must incorporate our evolutionary history, biology, and future. In other
words, this thesis will demonstrate that the traditional way of referring the notion of imago
Dei exclusively to humans needs some readjustment. In this thesis, then, considering the
contribution of Biological, Cultural, and Epistemic evolution and the similarities and
divergences between humans and nonhuman species, we will propose the extension of the
notion of imago Dei to every living species in different ways. The claim that we will
demonstrate is that every living species is imago Dei in different ways.
The first chapter will trace the metaphor of the imago Dei through different phases
of its history. We will present different approaches to the imago Dei. We will emphasize
the meaning of imago Dei from the biblical perspective before focusing on the patristic and
medieval Eastern and Western contributions on imago Dei, where the structural view of
the imago Dei will be developed. From there, we will analyze the functionality, or
stewardship, and the communal, or relational, views of imago Dei. The second chapter will
focus mainly on Contemporary Evolutionary theories, but we will begin by paying
attention to Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism, which are the foundation for Contemporary
evolutionary theories, like Social Darwinism, Sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and
cultural evolution. In that context of the contemporary evolutionary theories, we will
analyze the emergence of the modern humans, where the similarities and divergences
between modern humans and chimpanzees will be emphasized. The third chapter will
demonstrate how the evolutionary perspective sheds light on Christian anthropology. We
will demonstrate that when we speak of the human being as the product of contemporary
understanding of the Evolutionary theories, that requests an openness or an extension of
imago Dei to other species, but in different ways. From there, we will argue that having
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evolved along evolutionary pathways does not mean that we do not have purpose or value.
In the end, we will develop the notion of solidarity and sincerity between human beings as
imago Dei, and between human beings and the rest of creation as created also, in a different
way, in the image of God.

3

CHAPTER I: VARIOUS UNDERSTANDING OF IMAGO DEI
As the witness of Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium
makes clear, the truth that human beings are created in the
image of God is at the heart of Christian revelation. This truth
was recognized, and its broad implications expounded by the
Fathers of the Church and by the great scholastic theologians.
Although, as we shall note below, this truth was challenged by
some influential modern thinkers, today biblical scholars and
theologians join with the Magisterium in reclaiming and
reaffirming the doctrine of the imago Dei.2
Introduction
Among the three major monotheistic religious traditions, Judaism3, Islam4 and
Christianity, there is an agreement that, while everything is created by God, human beings
are the only thing created as imago Dei, meaning in the image of God, to whom God has
entrusted the rest of creation. During their history, each of these major religious traditions
has supported and explained in her own way the exclusive reference of imago Dei to human
beings. From the Christian perspective, especially from the Old Testament perspective, the
imago Dei referred to the whole of the human being, in the sense that the different
composite parts of the human person were not perceived as divided, like body or soul, flesh

2

International Theological Commission, Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the
Image of God,
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/cti_documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040723_co
mmunion-stewardship_en.html. (accessed November 26, 2019), 6.
3
The idea of imago Dei in Judaism is first of all found in the Torah and it can be found also in different
works, such as Yechiel Barilan, “From Imago Dei in the Jewish-Christian Traditions to Human Dignity in
Contemporary Jewish Law,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal 19, no. 3 (Sep 2009): 231-59; and
Dominique Scallisi, “5 Things Muslims and Christians Can Agree On,” Intellectual TakeOut (July 23, 2018),
https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/5-things-muslims-and-christians-can-agree/ (accessed April 22,
2020); and Martin Gosman, Holy Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Hermeneutics, Values and
Society (Amsterdam & Atlanta GA: Rodopi, 1997).
4
In Islam, the idea of imago Dei is also based in the Holy Scriptures, the Quran, and it can be found also in
some works like Admin, “Islam, End Times, and the Imago Dei,” Crosspolitic Studios, (2018),
https://crosspolitic.com/islam-end-times-and-the-imago-dei/ (accessed April 22, 2020); and Samuela Pagani,
“Imago Dei e l’Interdizione di Uccidere Nell’Islam. Il Capitolo su Giona Dei Fusus Al-Hikam Di Ibn’Arabi,’’
in In The Image of God: Foundations and Objections within the Discourse on Human Dignity, ed. Alberto
Melloni, and Riccardo Saccenti (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010), 227-261.
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or spirit. It also referred to the capacity of the creatures to be in relation to the Creator and
to other creatures who look like them. And, in the New Testament, the imago Dei referred
principally to Jesus, the First-born, the true image of God.
However, in the course of history, the Church fathers from Eastern and Western
Christian traditions, emphasizing in their own way the meaning of the imago Dei,
dissociated themselves from the reference of the imago Dei to the whole of human person,
i.e., the undivided person. From the distinction of being in the likeness or being in the
image, they considered that the whole of the human person cannot be at the same time the
likeness and the image of God. The medieval thinkers emphasized their own meaning of
the imago Dei by referring the image of God in the human person to some cognitive faculty
that the human being has, such as reason. That approach was already developed by
Augustine of Hippo during the Latin father period. Referring the image of God in the
human person to reason or self-consciousness is qualified as the structural view of imago
Dei. Alongside the structural view, there are the relational or communal view and the
functional or stewardship view of the imago Dei.
In the context of this first chapter of our thesis, we will begin by clarifying the
meaning of imago Dei from the biblical perspective where the imago Dei is understood as
undivided and relational, before presenting the perception of the imago Dei from the
patristic, medieval, and contemporary periods in the Eastern and Western Christian
traditions. From there, we will emphasize the two other views: the functionality or
stewardship and the communal or relational dimensions of the imago Dei.

5

1.1. The imago Dei from the official teaching of the Catholic
The Catechism of the Catholic Church reaffirms that when God created men and
women, He created them to occupy a unique place in creation, to be the image of God, to
unite the spiritual and material worlds; male and female God creates them and established
his friendship with them.5 Among all visible creatures, The Catechism states that “only
man is able to know and love his creator.”6 Man is also confirmed as the “only creature on
earth that God has willed for its own sake, and he alone is called to share, by knowledge
and love, in God’s own life.”7 The Catechism makes it clear that “being in the image of
God the human individual possesses the dignity of a person, who is not just something, but
someone. He is capable of self-knowledge, of self-possession and freely giving himself
and entering into communion with other persons.”8 According to The Catechism, “God
created everything for man, but man in turn was created to serve and love God and to offer
all creation back to him.”9 The human person as created in the image of God is “a being at
once corporal and spiritual. […] Man, whole and entire, is therefore willed by God.”10 The
emphasis was more on the whole person rather than on individual qualities or capacities of
the structural imago Dei.
Men and women as willed by God are on one hand “in perfect equality as human
persons; on the other, in their respective beings as man and woman.”11 Being made in the
image of God, men and women “possess an inalienable dignity which comes to them

5

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, Revised edition. (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 1995), 355.
Gaudium et Spes, 12.
7
Ibid., 24.
8
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 357.
9
Ibid., 358.
10
Ibid., 362.
11
Ibid., 369.
6
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immediately from God their Creator. Man and woman are both with one and the same
dignity in the image of God.”12 Man and woman are created to complement each other, to
be in communion with one another, with the world and with God. In that communion,
according to The Catechism “man and woman have the vocation of ‘subduing’ the earth as
stewards of God. This sovereignty is not to be an arbitrary and destructive domination.”13
It continues by stating that “God calls man and woman, made in the image of the Creator,
[…] to share in his providence towards other creatures, hence responsibility for the world
God has entrusted to them.”14 With the help of the encyclical letter Laudato Si’ and the
Ecology at the Heart of Faith of Denis Edwards, we will come back in the third chapter to
this model of stewardship.15
The Catechism has also clarified that God is not in man’s image. It states “in no way
is God in man’s image. He is neither man nor woman. God is pure spirit in which there is
no place for the difference between the sexes.”16 However in their respective perfection,
man and woman reflect something of the infinite perfection of God: those of a mother and

12

The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 373.
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
We will then insist on the invitation of Pope Francis to humans for the importance of ethics in our
relationship to the environment. This is an approach to ecology which respects our unique place as human
beings in this world and our relationship to our surroundings. And after presenting briefly the 5 models
(kinship with creation; domination of nature; ecological egalitarianism; kinship within a community; and
cultivating and caring for creation) of relationship between human beings and the rest of the creation of
Edwards, we will emphasize the fifth model ‘the cultivating and caring for creation’. According to Edwards,
the cultivating and caring model is where human beings can see themselves as interrelated in a community
of life with other creatures, who are also the self-expression of God, and in this sense, the image of God like
human beings. Cf. Denis Edwards, Ecology at the Heart of Faith: The Change of Heart that leads to a New
Way of Living on Earth (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 14-26.
16
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 370.
13
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wife and those of a father and husband. These are briefly what we can learn from the official
teaching of Catholicism from The Catechism of the Catholic Church.17
1.2. The imago Dei from the Scriptures: Old and New Testament
The concept of imago Dei is traditionally referred to human beings. And the idea
of human beings as created in the image of God is at the real heart of the Christian
revelation. Before getting to the traditional reference of the theme of imago Dei in Genesis,
it can be noted that the theme imago Dei “emerges from a common royal ideology where
individual Mesopotamian, Hittite, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian priests-kings are
referred to as the image and likeness of particular gods.”18 The imago Dei (selem elohîm)
in Hebrew, which is the term used in Genesis, is “the exact counterpart of the Akkadian
expression (salam [God’s name]) ‘image of Enlil [Marduk, etc.]’), an expression which
often appears as an epithet of Mesopotamian priest-kings.”19 “Reference to the king as the
image (salmu) of God abound in the Neo-Assyrian royal correspondence.”20 In the ancient
Near Eastern conception, the king (understood as a priest-king) was seen as “the god’s
authorized deputy or viceroy on earth.”21 In fact, “description of Near Eastern Kings as the
image of a god . . . provides the most plausible set of parallels for interpreting the imago
Dei in Genesis.”22 From the book of Genesis, God said:

17

In addition to this teaching, we have a text, Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons created in the
Image of God, developed by an International Theological Commission held at Rome during the period
2000-2002. This document was submitted to Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, the President of the Commission,
who has given his permission for its publication in 2004.
18
Joshua Moritz, “One Imago Dei and the Incarnation of the Eschatological Adam,” in Astrotheology:
Science and Theology Meet Extraterrestrial Life, chap. 19, Kindle.
19
Phyllis A. Bird, “Theological Anthropology in the Hebrew Bible,” in The Blackwell Companion to the
Hebrew Bible, ed. Leo Perdue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 260–261.
20
Simo Parpola, “The Assyrian Tree of Life: Tracing the Origins of Jewish Monotheism and Greek
Philosophy,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 52, no. 3 (1993): 168.
21
Richard Middleton, The Liberating Image: The Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids Michigan: Brazos
Press, 2005), 119.
22
Ibid., 121.
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Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness; and let them have
dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle,
and over all the wild animals of the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps
upon the earth. So, God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he
created them; male and female he created them.23
This is the written account of Adam's family line. When God created mankind, he
made them in the likeness of God. He created them male and female and blessed
them. And he named them "Mankind" when they were created. When Adam had
lived 130 years, he had a son in his own likeness, in his own image; and he named
him Seth.24
Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed; for in the image
of God has God made mankind.25
These passages from Genesis are in the context of the narrative of creation. In this
narration, the fact that the human beings are made in the likeness and image of God leads
Gerhard von Rad to identify human beings as “God’s representative in the world.”26
Theologians like Jack Mahoney, SJ, said the “passage was given a special anthropological
interpretation based on what was considered uniquely characteristic of humanity above all
other creatures.”27 Traditionally, imago Dei is referred to men and women because when
“God created man in his image; in the image of God he created him; male and female, he
created them.”28
From the biblical interpretation, God has created male and female29 in his image. The
theme imago Dei is “seen as the key to the biblical understanding of human nature and to
all the affirmations of biblical anthropology in both the Old and New Testaments.” 30 The

23

Gen.1: 26-27.
Gen. 5: 1-3.
25
Gen. 9: 6.
26
Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary, 2nd rev. ed. (London: SCM, 1963), 55.
27
Jack Mahoney, “Evolution, Altruism, and the Image of God” Theological Studies 71, no.3 (Sep 2010):
678.
28
Gen. 1:27; cf. Gen. 5:1-2.
29
In Familiaris Consortio, Pope John Paul II clarifies how male and female all share equal dignity and
responsibility and how they are equally created in God’s image. Men and women have equal dignity and
responsibility because they are all created in the image of God. Unfortunately, the history left us a kind of
discrimination and dominance of male over female, which is not really what all created in the image of God
should be.
30
International Theological Commission, 7.
24
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imago Dei at this point is the definition of humanity. And the mystery of imago Dei seems
strongly connected to the mystery of God. The biblical interpretation understood the imago
Dei as the whole of the human being, as The Catechism has reaffirmed. Whenever we read
how God creates Mankind in His image, the text never divides mankind as if God creates
the intellect or reason or the domination of humankind.
Biblical anthropology excludes mind-body dualism. It speaks of man as a whole.
Among the basic Hebrew terms for man used in the Old Testament, nèfèš means
the life of a concrete person who is alive (Gen 9:4; Lev. 24:17-18, Proverbs 8:35).
But man does not have a nèfèš; he is a nèfèš (Gen 2:7; Lev 17:10). Basar refers to
the flesh of animals and of men, and sometimes the body as a whole (Lev 4:11;
26:29). Again, one does not have a basar, but is a basar. The New Testament term
sarx (flesh) can denote the material corporality of man (2 Cor 12:7), but on the
other hand also the whole person (Rom. 8:6). Another Greek term, soma (body)
refers to the whole man with emphasis on his outward manifestation. Here too man
does not have his body but is his body. Biblical anthropology clearly presupposes
the unity of man and understands bodyliness to be essential to personal identity.31
Created in the image of God, every part of the human being participates in the being
and becoming of the imago Dei. The biblical interpretation of imago Dei as united man is
shaped by two themes: “the whole of man is seen as created in the image of God. […] (and)
the creation accounts in Genesis make it clear that man is not created as an isolated
individual.”32 The human body or the human spirit or mind or reason are all part of the
imago Dei without insistence on one part. Even when the Gospel insists on the fact that
“the word became flesh” (sarx), the Evangelist surely makes it clear that Jesus has a real
physical body which is not a phantom body (as this could favor Docetism), a real body
which is part of the being of Jesus as the perfection of imago Dei. It is clear with the
biblical interpretation that imago Dei is a unified reality and that human bodyliness is part
of the image of God. Not only has God created mankind not divided but He has created

31
32

International Theological Commission, 28.
Ibid., 9-10.
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mankind as a relational person. The first human beings were placed in relation with other
persons, with the world, with God and with themselves. So, the created image from the Old
Testament is that mankind is neither a divided person nor an isolated person.
From the New Testament, the perfect and true imago Dei is in the imago Christi.
The theme of imago Dei as Mahoney emphasizes, “was transposed from the Hebrew
Bible's treatment of it as an anthropological statement about the creation of humanity to
the center of Christian theology with Paul's identification of Christ as the image of the
invisible God, the firstborn of all creation.”33 He continues by mentioning that “through
his human existence and actions Jesus has presented us with a unique eikon, or created
representation, of his heavenly Father, and we in turn are being called to be associated with
Christ as his brothers and sisters.”34
Jesus Christ is seen as the true and perfect image of God or, “in the original Greek,
as the icon of God.”35 In the letter to the Corinthians, Paul speaks of Christ as the image of
God. He says: “the god of this age has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot
see the light of the gospel that displays the glory of Christ, who is the image of God.”36 It
is in His grace that others are conformed to His image. In the letter to the Hebrews, the
author states, “the Son is the radiance of God's glory and the exact representation of his
being, sustaining all things by his powerful word. After he had provided purification for
sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty in heaven.”37 And it is confirmed that
others are conformed to this image by grace in the letter to Romans, “for those God

33

Mahoney, 679.
Ibid.
35
Edwards, 15.
36
2 Cor 4: 4.
37
Heb 1: 3.
34
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foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the
firstborn among many brothers and sisters.”38 The hymn to Christ in the Letter to the
Colossians sings of Christ as the “image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation.”39
Jesus is the true and perfect image of God, “the one in whom all things are created and the
one in whom all are reconciled.”40 The imago Christi as the perfect imago Dei determines
the becoming of others as imago Dei, so that “to become the image of God requires an
active participation on man’s part in his transformation according to the pattern of the
image of the Son […] who manifests his identity by the historical movement from his
incarnation to his glory.”41
The transformation to the imago Christi, so that to become an imago Dei is a
journey of conversion from sin to salvation and consummation which is accomplished
through the sacraments. Created as imago Dei and perfected as imago Christi by the power
of the Holy Spirit in the sacraments, we are embraced in love by the Father. The imago
Christi is the full or complete revelation of what it means to be created in imago Dei. “In
him (imago Christi), we find the total receptivity to the Father which should characterize
our own existence, the openness to the other in an attitude of service which should
characterize our relations with our brothers and sisters in Christ, and the mercy and love
for others which Christ, as the image of the Father, displays for us.”42 This transformation
to the imago Christi is a form of the biblical tradition.

38

Rom 8: 29.
Col 1: 15.
40
Edwards, 15.
41
International Theological Commission, 12.
42
Ibid., 53.
39
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The theology of imago Dei as perfected in imago Christi finds some clarifications
from Gaudium et Spes, where it states that
It is only in the mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of man truly
becomes clear. For Adam, the first man, was a type of him who was to come, Christ
the Lord. Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father
and of his love, fully reveals man to himself and brings to light his most high
calling. No wonder, then, that all the truths mentioned so far should find in him
their source and their most perfect embodiment.43
Here, Jesus is the one who reveals to men and women the fullness of their being because
of having been created “through him and in him.”44 Becoming imago Dei is no longer in
the past but it is in the future. Ted Peters in “The Imago Dei as the End of Evolution”45 has
developed an idea about the human race becoming imago Dei at the end (terminus as
conclusion and telos as goal) in imago Christi who despite having been after Adam,
“provides the definition of what is truly Adam”46, in the sense that the sin which is
conceived to come after the being imago Dei, now precedes it. Peters develops a
complementary approach between evolutionary science and the eschatology. “For
creatures within the lengthy story of evolution, the imago Dei is the divine call forward, a
call we hear and respond to now but that draws us towards transformation into a future
reality.”47 He continues by affirming that “the full flourishing of the image of God in
humans is a promise to hope for.”48 It is in the eschatology that we hope to see the fullness
of the imago Dei. And with the proleptic model, “we begin with Jesus Christ, not Adam
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and Eve. Accordingly, we begin with the resurrected Christ and then, retroactively
incorporate Christ’s imago into ourselves through faith, hope and love.”49
The proleptic model as the promise to rise in the new creation with Christ who rose
on Easter, synthetizes creation and redemption, and includes ontological (“it is the being
of God’s future that determines the being of all that has happened in past nature and
history”50) and ethical components (“ethics as human action aimed at making tomorrow
better than yesterday. The Christian ethicist begins with a vision of God’s future and then
seeks to work creatively to transform present reality in light of this vision.”51) With his
contribution, Peters clarifies from evolutionary and eschatological perspectives how the
fullness of the imago Dei derives “not from Adam and Eve in the past but from the
eschatological Christ in the future. (and) […] when we and the cosmos are redeemed, we
will be fully created. Then God can finally say, “Behold, it is very good.”52
1.3. The imago Dei from the Patristic and Medieval views in Eastern and
Western traditions
1.3.1. From Eastern Christianity
In general, the biblical anthropology of imago Dei as non-divided and non-isolated
has occupied a prominent “place in Christian anthropology in the Fathers of the Church
and in later theology, right up to the beginning of modern times.”53 An indication of the
centrality of the biblical vision of the image of God can be found in the endeavor of early
Christians “to interpret the biblical prohibition against artistic representations of God (cf.
Ex 20:2f; Dt 27:15) in the light of the incarnation. For the mystery of the incarnation
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demonstrated the possibility of representing the God-made-man in his human and historical
reality.”54 We can recall the defense of artistic representation of the Incarnate Word and of
the events of salvation during the iconoclastic controversies of the seventh and eighth
centuries which “rested on a profound understanding of the hypostatic union which refused
to separate the divine and the human in the image.”55
In their development of the notion of imago Dei, the Eastern and Western Christian
traditions developed differently. The Eastern tradition, with the Greek fathers, focused not
only on the notion of image, but also expanded on the notion of person which refers to
Christ as one person with two natures.56 In “The Human Person as Image of God: Eastern
Christianity,” Lars Thunberg explained that the human as a person in Christian spirituality
is not an individualistic human being, but “the human person is always seen as in a social
context. […] (it is) also always understood as being created in the image of God.”57 The
human being as a social person and not as an antisocial individual and God as the
“copersonal counterpart are seen as the decisive factors in this spirituality.”58 Image and
person are two concepts crucial to the way that the human being as person is always
understood as being created in the image of God, because “Divine life is understood as
personal. (And) God is divinity in three persons-and thus the human being, as bearing the
image of God, is necessarily a person.”59
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God as one substance manifesting in three persons – the Father, the Son, and the
Holy Spirit – led to the insight that the person is the individualization within the same
nature or species. Therefore, the ancient church considers “Christ as divine/human person
(Greek hypostasis, Latin persona) which means that the category of person transcends the
limits of what is naturally given. Christ consists of two natures but is nevertheless one
person, as the Council of Chalcedon in 451 stated.”60 In this logic, the early Christian
Church despite considering humans as composite beings – body and soul – considered the
human being as “unity charged by God with a purpose in the world that is linked to their
being in the image of God.”61 The human being as imago Dei was still considered by the
early Christians as a unity, meaning as a whole human despite the composite being that is
the human person, and the evaluation of human beings was not possible without
considering “their relationship to God – one in three persons – or to Christ, the
divine/human Savior, who is one person in two natures.”62
The early church that emerged within the Hellenistic cultural context, where it was
bound to deal with both Greek philosophy and the Old Testament in its Greek version, the
Septuagint, produced a significant development of the biblical account which makes a
distinction between the image and the likeness. However, at a certain point, the patristic
and medieval theology diverged from the biblical vision which identified the imago Dei
with the whole man, meaning the undivided or totality of man. Therefore, the rendering of
Gen 1:26 “seems more explicitly distinctive: the human is created not only ‘in the image
of God’ (kat’ eikona) but also ‘into his likeness’ (kat’ homoiosin), and this seems to imply
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a distance between what is given at the outset and what could be realized within the
category of time.”63 And combined with the concept of humanity’s fall and sinfulness, “it
might lead to an understanding of humans as in tension between their ‘ontological’ image
character and their ‘moral’ similitude.”64 And, adopting the view of the New Testament
which defines the true image of God in Christ, because Christ is identical with the creative
Word/Logos and incarnate in humanity, the early Church reaffirmed, like all the Christian
tradition, that human beings are according to the image of Christ, which means, human
beings are the image of the image of God. The Logos is seen as the prototype, which “God
used in creating humans in his image, and Christ is seen as the archetype of what is to be
human. But Christ is, in his duality, also a person. And thus, human beings, in reflecting
the archetype successively, may develop their likeness to God as personal fulfillment.”65
In their distinction between image and likeness, first references by Christian authors
go back to the debate on the composite beings of humans, as body and soul, or as flesh and
spirit which has impacted considerably the notion of the non-divided imago Dei. Origen of
Alexandria or Origen Adamantius (185-254), who basing himself on Genesis 1:26 (where
God is said to have created man in his image and likeness), and Genesis 2:7 (where we
learned that God created the human out of the dust and breathed his own spirit into the
human’s nostrils), “constructed a theory of a double creation 66: the first being one of pure
spirits gathered around God, but finally falling into corruption; the second being
effectuated by God in the act of rescuing fallen creation, giving humans bodies to gather
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up their falling and frozen souls (psychai).”67 This theory of double creation which
supposed that there was no initial coexistence of body and soul, was condemned as heresy.
It was condemned because it was in conflict with the traditional view of creation as good.
The second reference is Irenaeus of Lyons (120/140-200/203) who is considered as
the first to have elaborated the human duality and “who regarded Adam as not yet mature
but endowed with a divine task to develop his capacities to their fullness.”68 But because
of the fall, this development was interrupted. It was only in the restoration of humanity in
Christ that humans could regain their freedom.
Gregory Nazianzen (329-389), one of the three Cappadocian fathers, wrestled
considerably with the problem of the composite makeup of human beings, which are the
mixture of body/soul, and flesh/spirit. According to Gregory, as body and soul, human
person is fully initiated into the visible creation but only partially into the intellectual.
However, being partially initiated into the intellectual creation is “not only the expression
of the fallenness of human beings (as in Origen), but also a sign of their being preserved—
by God in creating them both body and soul—from the most disastrous destiny
(exemplified by the fallen angel Lucifer) of a creation that revolts against its Creator.”69
The human composite being of body and soul is understood as the special prerogative of
human persons, which puts humans “into a unique position within the created order without
letting them either usurp the exclusive position of God or be absorbed by material creation.
They are in a position in between, which implies struggle, and it is precisely this position
that renders humans both weak and pretentious.”70
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Gregory of Nyssa (332-395), another Cappadocian father, did not agree with
Origen’s approach of two creations, which makes the coexistence of the soul and body as
something which happened in the second creation. For Gregory of Nyssa, in De hominis
opificio (On the Creation of Man), “the Origenist position was intimately connected with
an idea of metempsychosis and he argued that a fall into the material world would not imply
a purification but rather successive falls—or a superiority of sensual life over against
spiritual life.”71
Like the others Church fathers, Maximus the Confessor (580-662) rejects the theory
of Origen and affirmed that body and soul are linked to each other by necessity. For
Maximus, it is part of God’s plan that human beings should consist of body and soul, and
“body and soul not only form a composite nature, with its own principle of being, but also
a complete species. Thus, the human as a composite being is unique, and it is this
uniqueness that is according to the image.”72
Cyril of Alexandria (378-444), making used of the analogy between humanity’s
composite and the unity between divine and human nature in Christ, explained that “since
Christ is the true image of God, this analogy seems to convey to the whole of humanity a
secondary image character, which is fundamental and basic, even if it remains a fact that
the early church located the image of God in humans in the soul, particularly in the higher
part of the soul, the mind (nous).”73
With this understanding of human composite being, the early church established
the distinction between image and likeness in the biblical story of creation. It seems that in
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Hebrew, the “terms selem (image) and dĕmût (likeness) do not convey any such distinction
but are simply synonyms. But in the Greek Old Testament, the terms eikon (image) and
homoiōsis (likeness) seem to be more open to a distinction between two meanings.”74
Origen as a Greek father linked this distinction with his theory of double creation. He
believes that, in Genesis 1:26, because both image and likeness are mentioned, God’s final
intention is sketched out, and because in Genesis 1:27, only the image is mentioned, this
indicated “that human being received in the first creation the dignity of image but the
perfection of the likeness was reserved for the end of history on account of God’s
pedagogical efforts as well as humanity’s positive imitation of God.”75 At the end, for
Origen, “likeness was acquired by human beings through imitation of God.”76
According to Irenaeus of Lyons, who has been the first church father to use the
distinction of image and likeness77 in the sense that “image’ denotes an ontological
participation (methexis) and ‘likeness’ (mimesis) a moral transformation,”78 the human
character of image is not a sign of perfection, but it indicates “a task, the culmination of
which is supposed to be likeness to God.”79 For Irenaeus, the image is used to refer to
humanity created by God and likeness is used for what occurs when human beings are
conformed to Christ through grace.80 In other words, “the mind which alone carries the
divine image, is bound down through its relationship to the body and has to free itself
through ascetic efforts in order to gain the divine likeness.”81

74

Thunberg, 297-298.
Ibid., 298.
76
Ibid.
77
Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 5.6.1: Migne, PG 7.1137-38; in Mahoney, 679.
78
International Theological Commission, 15.
79
Thunberg, 298.
80
Edwards, 15.
81
Thunberg, 298.
75

20

While Irenaeus makes his distinction between the ontological participation and the
moral transformation, Tertullian (155-222), one of the Latin fathers, notes that “God
created man in his image and gave him the breath of life as his likeness. (And) while the
image can never be destroyed, the likeness can be lost by sin.”82
For Maximus the Confessor, likeness seems to be above the image, but the use of
the distinction between image and likeness did not seem to cause any difficulty. For him,
“human beings are created in the image of God, in order that they may become like God.
And this likeness is both their own maturity as human beings and their fulfillment as a
microcosmic and mediating task within the created universe.”83
1.3.2. From Western Christianity
The question of the imago Dei in the course of the history of the early Church was
not only the preoccupation of Eastern Christianity,84 it was also the preoccupation of
Western Christianity. With Origen, Irenaeus of Lyons, Gregory of Nazianzen, Gregory of
Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and Maximus the Confessor, we emphasize their divergence

82

International Theological Commission, 17.
Thunberg, 299.
84
In the Eastern Christian early church, there was also the concern about the question of dominion. The
human dominion over the earth as part of the image character is understood as a spiritual enterprise, and,
when human beings become absorbed by the material side of this enterprise, this is regarded as an expression
of their sinfulness. While Origen believes in his homily on Genesis 1:26, that humanity holds a position of
dominion in creation because of the rational souls and not because of their bodies, even though they are a
unity of both, Basil the Great makes observation about humanity’s role in relation to the animals, John
Chrysostom states that nothing on earth is superior to humanity and that everything is submitted to it,
Theodoret of Cyrus observes that human beings are exercising dominion in their accomplishment, Cyril of
Alexandria believes that the actual exertion of dominion is also an additional gift of God, since everything
that we possess is a gift of God, Philo understood the dominion as a dominion over the passions, since the
passions are a manifestation of what humanity shares with the animals. For all these church fathers, the
human dominion within creation has to be exerted through reason and has to have God’s dominion as its
model. And human dominion over the earth has to be exerted in parallel to the development of mastery over
bodily passions. Human dominion does not imply a subjugation of the created order to human will in
opposition to other purposes, but a creative communication with the universe in its differentiation, the
purposes of which rest immobile in God’s own intention. Cf. Lars Thunberg, 299-304.
83

21

from the biblical perspective of imago Dei, but also their approach of the composite beings
of the human persons which are the bases on which most of them build their divergence.
In the Western tradition, “the ways in which Latin authors understood how
humanity was made in and reformed to God’s image were much influenced by their
inheritance from both Jewish and Greek sources.”85 The Western Christian authors not only
used the Old Testament which contains the Hebrew view of the human person as called by
God to acts of loving obedience, but they also used the anthropology of Greek
philosophers, like Plato and his followers, with its notion of the soul as bearing an image
of divinity.86 There were some important differences between Jewish and Greek
anthropologies. While the Greek anthropology makes a distinction between the body and
soul “which led to an emphasis on the latter as the true person and an insistence that the
soul’s immortality was the true human destiny,”87 the “traditional Jewish anthropology
knew nothing of the distinction between body and soul, and in its apocalyptic phase had
created the notion of the resurrection of the body in order to vindicate divine justice in a
time of persecution.”88 Even if Christian authors made use of Greek philosophical language
in explaining their anthropology, their use of it is radically new, because of the trinitarian
and Christological character of medieval understanding of the imago Dei,
Divinization, a concept taken over from the Greeks, was given a new content in
Christian belief and practice, not only through the new religion’s insistence on the
necessity of grace to restore the image but also because Christian understanding of
the image itself was based not upon a fluid Greek notion of divinity but rather on

Bernard McGinn, “The Human Person as Image of God: Western Christianity,” in Christian Spirituality:
Origins to the Twelfth Century, ed. Bernard McGinn, John Meyendorff, and Jean Leclercq. (New York:
Crossroad, 1985), 313.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
85

22

the mystery of the one God who had revealed himself as Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit.89
In Western Christianity during the patristic and medieval period, three possible
traditions of imago Dei were established: “that which finds the image of God primarily in
the person considered as an intellectual subject; that which concentrates on the freedom of
the subject as the true location of the image; and that which emphasizes the interpersonal
character of the image.”90 To understand what it means to be created in the image and
likeness of God, Augustin and Marius Victorinus made use of Neoplatonic thought.
Victorinus makes a distinction between the Logos, who is the true imago Dei, and the
human soul, which is created ad imaginem—that is, after the pattern of the Logos.91 For
Victorinus, the original human person whose creation is described in Gen 1:26 bears the
divine image – the soul possesses ‘to be,’ ‘to live,’ and to ‘understand’ in conformity with
the three divine persons, whereas the body’s division into two sexes as recounted in the
story of the creation of terrestrial humanity in Gen 2:7 mirrors the double nature of the
Logos as both male and female.92
For St. Augustine, instead of a distinction between image and likeness, he presents
a more personalistic, psychological and existential account of the imago Dei. Using his life
story in the Confessions, Augustine broke93 with Neoplatonic anthropology,94 “human
destiny is no longer seen as the absorption of the individual back into the All, but as the
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recovery of the true self through divine reordering of the will.”95 To become a true human
person, there is a need for confession, a need for a direct interpersonal address to God
which is simultaneously confession of our own sinfulness and praise of God’s lovingkindness.96 Augustine developed the notion of imago as a particular kind of likeness
(similitudo) in the way that the image is expressive of its source because of proximity and
because its nature is formed through conversion, that is, a dynamic turning back toward the
source in the very moment of its creation.97
“Like Victorinus, Augustine admitted that some images can have a relation of
equality with their source, […] (but) unlike Victorinus, Augustine insisted with Paul (1Cor
11:7) that the human person can be said not only to be made ad imaginem but also to be in
itself a true imago Dei.”98 Augustine rejected99 also the idea according to which the sexual
division of humanity could be the result of the fall.100 In The Trinity, exploring how the
whole of created reality mirrored the triune God101 and how the inner person had been
created as a special image of the one God, Augustine insisted that “the external world and
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even the outer person (homo exterior) bear only the vestiges of the Trinity (vestigia
Trinitatis) and that only the inner person can be seen as a real imago Trinitatis.”102 For
Augustine, the image of the triune God resides only in the mens, or the higher dimension
of the soul. According to Augustine, it is in that part of human nature wherein the human
being surpasses the brute and beasts, which of course, is reason, mind or intelligence, and
that human beings are made in the image of God. It is in that part of his nature that man is
made in the image of God.103
“Augustine developed understanding of the human person as trinitarian image
based both upon love and knowledge.”104 Augustine makes it clear that “the image of God
in man orients him to God in invocation, knowledge and love.”105 In his understanding of
the mind as the imago Trinitatis, Augustine concludes that “the image of God in man has
a Trinitarian structure, reflecting either the tripartite structure of the human soul (spirit,
self-consciousness, and love) or the threefold aspects of the psyche (memory, intelligence,
and will).”106 And “it is only because the human person retains the image of the Trinity
even after sin that it is possible for God’s grace to restore that image through act of
knowing, remembering, and loving him.”107 Augustine108 placed clearly the imago
character of the human subject in its intellectual nature.109
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As McGinn notes, it is good to remember that “Augustine’s view of the human
subject as the imago Trinitatis always needs to be considered in the light of his thoughts
on the mystery of grace and freedom.”110 Augustine was resolutely opposed to any
conception of freedom as the unhindered autonomy or self-determination of the individual
subject. For him, “freedom was always in need of a modifier – it was freedom ‘to’ or
freedom ‘from.’ Adam’s freedom had a degree of versatility not open to his
descendants.”111 But, after the fall, “humanity was freely bound to sin and enjoyed a
perverse freedom from justice; Christ restored true freedom (libertas) to our power of free
choice (liberum arbitrium) by granting freedom from bondage to sin and the freedom to
cooperate with grace in living according to caritas.”112 This Augustinian anthropology
about the human person as imago Dei was challenged by other Western Christians church
fathers and medieval thinkers, but it was preserved during the Middle Ages by Benedictine
monasticism.
Pope Gregory the Great (540-604), one of the Latin fathers, who was Pope from
590 till his death, has contributed considerably to the Western Christian anthropology. He
is known as someone who did more to form the monastic culture and mentality, especially
in areas dealing with the situation of the human person. He based his anthropology largely
on that of Augustine, with a genuine capacity to emphasize his own view. “Gregory’s acute
sense of human misery as a result of sin […] was joined to an intense realization of how
compunction for our sinful state gives rise to the desire for the experience of God as a
foretaste of the perfect life to be enjoyed in heaven”113 At the same moment that Gregory
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the Great insisted that in contemplation of God, a person recognizes his own worthlessness,
he was also convinced that in that contemplation the taste of interior quiet is already
experienced.114
John the Scot (800-877) also made use of the intellectual heritage of Augustine, but
more often he used the approaches of the Greek fathers. His Periphyseon contains a
profound theological anthropology of a pronounced Neoplatonic character. In that book,
after adopting the traditional understanding of human person as created ad imaginem
(because the Logos is the true imago Dei), and the understanding according to which the
image resides in the human person’s higher intellectual nature and bears a trinitarian
structure, John the Scot went further “by insisting that the idea of humanity (homo) is the
first of the primordial causes in which God created all things.”115 For him, man was made
among the primordial causes in the image of God, so that in man, every creature, both
intelligible and sensible, should become an inseparable unity, and that the man should be
the mediating term and unification of all creatures.116 In that same logic, he explained that
the first creation was a spiritual one in which all things “were united in the primordial idea
of the First Man, Adam. His fall through pride produced the differentiated material universe
in which we now live, but this world of division is being led back to its pristine unity
through the saving work of the New Man, Christ the incarnate Word.”117 The human person
at this point, for John the Scot, is “a particular intellectual idea eternally created in the mind
of God (Periphyseon 4.7) – and the real similarity between the image and its divine
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Exemplar paradoxically resides more in ignorance than in knowledge.”118 Therefore, as
human beings, according to John the Scot, we are most truly the image of God in our
inability to grasp or define our true nature, which precisely as imago Dei remains forever
mysterious.
Other important figures in the Western tradition are Bernard of Clairvaux (10901153), who saw human freedom as the site of the image, and Richard of St. Victor ( died
in 1173), whose thought contains profound reflections on how the interpersonal human
subject is an image of the three-personed God.119 As a likely a master of the Cistercian
school and the only rival of Augustine among medieval Latin authors, Bernard insisted on
self-knowledge, which consists of three things: that a person know what he has done, what
he deserves, and what he has lost.120 Self-knowledge and self-love are the path to the loving
union with God. Like Augustine’s view of freedom, Bernard was “fundamentally
theocentric in the sense that God’s unfailing goodness as the free and spontaneous
expression of the divine being is the basic source of all liberty.”
Even if Bernard did not emphasize individual autonomy, Etienne Gilson claims that
Bernard finds the image of God par excellence in human free will. For the human person
who exercises self-knowledge and self-love, the image of God is in the free will.121 And
the freedom seems to have three states according to Bernard: freedom from necessity
(external coercion) which human beings possess, both before and after the fall, which
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assures that the sins are voluntary expression of human wills; freedom from sin (free
counsel) which humanity lost in the fall, and which is restored by Christ; and freedom from
sorrow (free from pleasure) which is the unfailing enjoyment of the goodness of God in
heaven. And as he said, “we must learn from our freedom of counsel not to abuse free
choice, in order that one day we may be able fully to enjoy freedom of pleasure. Thus we
are repairing the image of God in us, the way is being paved, by grace, for the retrieving
of that former honor which we forfeited by sin.”122 Evoking the distinction between image
and likeness, which helps to describe how humanity retained its basic relation with God
even after the fall, Bernard in Grace and Free Choice identified image with free choice123
and likeness with free counsel and free pleasure.124
Richard of St. Victor, from the Western Christian tradition, emphasizes
considerably the affective and intellectual powers of the soul in addressing the question of
the human person, and this affected his understanding of the Trinity. For Richard, as for all
his contemporaries, “the soul has two fundamental powers, love and knowledge, the two
feet by which we journey to God.”125 The love which Richard is talking about is the love
that is itself a form of knowing, a love which is not anti-intellectual, a love which allows
the transformation or divinization of the person, a love which is a true caritas, which is
opposed to the false self-love of cupiditas. And Richard, following Augustine, developed
an understanding of how the three persons can be one God through an analysis of the nature
of caritas. “God, who is by definition perfect charity or outpouring generous love, requires
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someone equal to himself toward whom to direct this love.”126 Like the shared love
between the persons of the Trinity, “in those who are mutually loved, the perfection of
each, in order to be completed, requires with equal reason a sharer of the love (condilectus)
that has been shown to them.”127 From this understanding of the Trinity as the supreme
shared love of three equal persons, Richard claims that “the human person, then, like the
divine person, is called to share love: this is what makes it what it is truly meant to be.
Being made in the image and likeness of God means being made to share in the shared love
of the Trinity, and like the Trinity to communicate that love to others.”128 So, being imago
Dei is being this new creature who lives a life of loving service to others. Therefore, the
true meaning of imago Dei, according to Richard, is to become an imago Christi in this
life.
While Bonaventure (1218-1274) understood that the image of God in the human
person is realized through the will in the religious act of man,129 Thomas Aquinas (12251274) believed that the image of God in the human is realized through reason, knowledge
and love. And holding that the human person is not only the soul, but a composition of the
body and soul, Thomas did not believe in an absolute separation of body and soul, but their
correlation or interdependence in man. By emphasizing the human body, Thomas did not
mean that the image of God is in man’s body, but “that the human body as a trace exhibits
the image of God, which is located in the soul.”130 While he claimed that all creatures
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possess some likeness to God, which he called a trace, he believed that only human being
is made in the image of God.131
For Thomas, “the imago Dei possesses an historical character, since it passes
through three stages: the imago creationis (naturae), the imago recreationis (gratiae), and
the similitudinis (gloriae).”132 For him, the human person is made in the image of God in
these three different ways. According to the stage of imago creationis (naturae), the human
person is the imago Dei because of his or her ability to know and to love. According to the
stage of imago recreationis (gratiae), the human person is the imago Dei when he or she
knows and loves God. And, according to the stage of similitudinis (gloriae), the human
person is the imago Dei when he or she knows and loves God in heaven as God knows and
loves Himself. At the heart of “St. Thomas’s account of the human person as the imago
Dei is his claim that the human person is made in the image of God because of his or her
rational nature, i.e., his or her ability to know and to love.”133 According to Thomas, being
imago Dei is to live, to think and to love. And being the imago Dei134 refers to the mind,
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reason, or rational soul which includes the intellect and will, the abilities of knowledge and
love, that human beings have but animals do not have. And to become the more perfect
image of God, human beings have to know and to love God, who is the most perfect object
of the acts of intellect and will.135 And this is “a profoundly Trinitarian insight because the
acts of knowing and loving are the acts that constitute the very persons of the Triune
God.136
It is clear in that case that only intellectual creatures are the image of God. The
imago Dei is the basis for participation in the divine life, and it is realized principally in an
act of contemplation in the intellect. While it is true, according to Thomas, that likeness is
common to all things, in the sense that the other creatures have the likeness without being
the image of God, it is true also that, for him, likeness relates to image as its perfection, in
the way that every time that the acts of knowledge and love, by seeking God as their object,
“are more like God than just their potential existence in the capacity of the rational
soul,…thus through these activities our image becomes more like God.”137 In reference to
the difference between potentiality and actuality, Thomas insists that we are more in the
image of God in our acts than in our powers. And because everything is created in Christ,
who is fully human— body, mind and spirit—He is the perfect image of God.
“Reformation controversies demonstrated that the theology of the imago Dei
remained important for both Protestant and Catholic theologians.”138 The Catholics are
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accused by the Reformers139 of reducing the imago Dei to an “imago naturae” which
offered a static conception of human nature and encouraged the sinner to constitute himself
before God. On their side, the Catholics accused the Reformers of denying the ontological
reality of the image of God and reducing it to a pure relation. In addition, the Reformers
insisted that the image of God was corrupted by sin, whereas Catholic theologians viewed
sin as a wounding of the image of God in man.140
1.4. The imago Dei during the contemporary period
Generally during history, the imago Dei retained its central position in theological
anthropology. But during the nineteenth and twentieth century, the notion of imago Dei
lost its centrality. It became unfavorable at some point. It was undermined because it was
regarded as an expression of human arrogance by which man compares himself to God and
by which man considers himself as more important than anything else. The view of the
universe has displaced the traditional comprehension of a cosmos as something made in
the divine image, and this has affected the theology of imago Dei. It is affected in the way
that the empiricists consider imago Dei as “ill-adapted to experience”141 while the
rationalists consider the idea of man as imago Dei ambiguous.
Some important intellectuals of the twentieth century, intellectuals like Ludwig
Feuerbach, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud, undermine the theology of the imago Dei. For
them, it is not a man who is made in the image of God, but it is God who is made in the
image of man. Here, God is nothing except an image projected by man. However, the
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interest in the theology of imago Dei grew again in the mid-twentieth century because of
the impact of Vatican II. “The council gave new impetus to the theology of the imago Dei,
most especially in the Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et Spes.
Invoking the theme of the image of God, the Council affirmed in Gaudium et Spes the
dignity of man.”142
When the Conciliar fathers asked, “What is man?” in Gaudium et Spes, they
answered, “About himself he has expressed, and continues to express many divergent and
even contradictory opinions. In these he often exalts himself as the absolute measure of all
things or debases himself to the point of despair.”143 But they reaffirmed, “for the Sacred
Scripture teaches that man was created ‘to the image of God,’ is capable of knowing and
loving his Creator, and was appointed by Him as master of all earthly creatures […] that
he might subdue them and use them to God’s glory.”144 The Conciliar fathers insisted on
the fact that a man is not a solitary, but called to be in community, which is the “primary
form of interpersonal communion.”145 The imago Dei of Vatican II consists “in man’s
orientation to God, which is the basis of the human dignity and of inalienable rights of the
human person.”146 It is because the human as person is imago Dei that no man could be
made subservient to any kind of system in the world.
The theology of imago Dei illumines somehow the relation between anthropology
and Christology. While opening to the unique grace which comes to human beings through
incarnation, theologians recognize the essential value of human beings created in the image
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of God. “The possibilities that Christ opens up for man do not involve the suppression of
the human reality in its creatureliness but its transformation and realization according to
the perfect image of the Son.”147 The theology of imago Dei is linked to Christology, but
it is linked also to moral theology by the fact that it shows man’s participation in divine
law, participation in the good in the action of men. Vatican II has helped to make it clear
that the imago Dei has also a “teleological and eschatological dimension which defines
man as homo viator, oriented to the parousia and to the consummation of the divine plan
for the universe.”148
In the contemporary period, Olli-Pekka Vainio149 and Aku Visala150 have defended
the structural approach of imago Dei. Vainio makes his argument by concentrating on the
question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and Robert Jenson.
Vainio argues that there is a significant overlap between contemporary scientific
interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary
ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. In his argumentation, he believes that it is possible
to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in
accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of
structuralism point out.
Visala begins his argumentation by analyzing the three major critiques against the
Structural view propose a modified structural imago Dei where he gives responses to the
critiques and identifies the imago Dei with the distinctiveness and a higher mental capacity
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of humans than other species. The first argument is that the structural view entails
mind/body dualism and dualism is no longer viable given neuroscience and contemporary
philosophy. Against that critique, Visala presents the contemporary forms of dualism
which circumvent those worries. Contrary to those who criticize the structural view
because it disvalues the human body, Visala argues that neither a structural nor dualism
approach disvalue the human body. The third issue consists of various evolutionary worries
that have to do with the lack of a clear-cut boundary between human capacities and the
capacities of non-human animals. Counter to this third critique of the structural view,
Visala defends an idea of human beings as distinctive and having certain mental capacities
to a higher degree than other species. As he states, “if other species were to develop similar
capacities to us, they would, at least to some extent, be images of God as well.”151
Alongside, the structural view of the imago Dei, there are the relational or communal, and
the functional or stewardship views of the imago Dei.
1.5. The imago Dei as a person of relation or communion
Created in the image of God from the narration of the first book of the Bible, Man
is understood as a person of communion or relation and a person of responsibility or
stewardship. Being created in the image of God, as non-divided and non-isolated, human
beings in their physical and spiritual beings are made for sharing a world with one another.
Created in the image of God, human beings are called to love, communion and relationship
between themselves and toward God, the Creator. “It is of the essence of the imago Dei in
them that these personal beings are relational and social beings, embraced in a human
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family whose unity is at once realized and prefigured in the Church.”152 The relational
dimension of the imago Dei is often explained by the radical relationship between the
divine persons of the Trinity153, which was emphasized abundantly in the course of history.
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We will come back to the Trinitarian relationship when we will present human beings as
part of a wider pattern of relationships in nature which is understood as grounded in the
trinitarian relations of mutual love, according to Edwards. A person made in God’s image
with his or her inalienable right of dignity, is not alone in the universe but is called to be in
community with others in society. “The human being is truly human to the extent that he
actualizes the essentially social element in his constitution as a person within familial,
religious, civil, professional, and other groups that together form the surrounding society
to which he belongs.”154 Being imago Dei, it is not proper to some human beings but it
concerns every human being in the society. Being imago Dei is also being in relationship
with another imago Dei’s but also with God.
Unfortunately, that relationship with God and others is often ruptured.
Theologically, the rupture is caused by sin which came from the abuse by the imago Dei
of his freedom. One thing which is generally admitted by every theologian is that the imago
Dei is not totally destroyed or corrupted by sin. For Catholic tradition, sin disfigures the
imago Dei, but it does not destroy it and the relational dimension of the imago Dei with
God is not lost because of sin.155 The relational dimension of the imago Dei toward God is
oriented towards its Christological realization. Against “the notion of the total corruption
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of the imago Dei, the Catholic tradition has insisted that grace and salvation would be
illusory if they did not in fact transform the existing, albeit sinful, reality of human
nature.”156 The man affected by sin does not stop desiring God. The sinful state even makes
the man in the need of salvation. Because sin cannot destroy that desire for God, man can
be saved by God’s grace. The necessity of salvation comes with the indestructible desire
or orientation of man toward God. With salvation, the imago Dei is freed from sin, from
law which is not inspired by the Holy-Spirit, from suffering, and from death to be
reconciled with God. Freed from all these, the imago Dei is free for God in Christ and the
Holy Spirit. This “freedom for” God in Christ and the Holy-Spirit “is made possible by
Jesus Christ, the perfect icon of the Father, who restores the image of God in man” and the
communal dimension of the imago Dei.
1.6. The imago Dei as a person of stewardship or responsibility
Created in the image of God, men and women are not only called to a life of
communion with one another and with God, there are also called as imago Dei to share the
governance or stewardship of visible creation, governance in the sense of care. This
privilege is granted to the imago Dei from the narration of creation where it is said, “God
blessed them (mankind): Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it. Have
dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all the living things that crawl on
the earth.”157 God allows the human to name all the animals158 and in His wisdom has
established humankind to rule the creatures produced by Him. 159 With this privilege, men
and women made in the image of God are called to participate in God’s work, his project
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of love and salvation and his own lordship over the universe. Paragraph 34 of Gaudium et
Spes states clearly that “Man was created in God's image and was commanded to conquer
the earth and to rule the world in justice and holiness: he was to acknowledge God as maker
of all things and relate himself and the totality of creation to him, so that through the
dominion of all things by man the name of God would be majestic in all the earth.”160
This sovereignty or stewardship holds an ascendancy over the whole of visible
creation as a king but also a descendancy image as the kenosis of Jesus Christ. In the
exercise of this sovereignty, men are supposed to respect the natural order, in other words,
the natural law which derives from the divine law. The Bible warns against the sin of
usurpation. Like in the case of the parable of talents (Mt 25: 14-31), the Lord entrusts the
imago Dei to act in his place as stewards who have freedom to develop the gifts which have
been entrusted to them. As stewards, every imago Dei must be aware that there will be time
when they must render an account of their care of creation. “Human stewardship of the
created world is precisely a stewardship exercised by way of participation in the divine rule
and is always subject to it. Human beings exercise this stewardship by gaining scientific
understanding of the universe, by caring responsibly for the natural world (including
animals and the environment), and by guarding their own biological integrity.”161 During
the nineteenth and twentieth century, the imago Dei has achieved a lot in his understanding
of the universe. And this scientific progress has considerable impact in the way that the
universe is perceived.
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By admitting the Big Bang theory162, the stardust163 and the emerging evolutionary
history of life164, we recognize that every stage during the evolutionary process, something
new occurs, like the Big Bang, hydrogen nuclei, stars, DNA molecule, single-cell like
eukaryotes, multi-cells like ediacara fauna, mammals, animals, vertebrates, marine life,
Dinosaurs, chimpanzees like apes, Autralopithecines, Homo rudolphensis, Homo Erectus
until Home sapiens. And at each one of these stages, the new species depend on what goes
before, even if each represents something new. With that recognition, everyone can clearly
see that “human beings share a common history of life with all the other creatures of Earth.
We carry within us a story of life that goes back to our pre-human ancestors in Africa, back
to the trilobites of the Cambrian seas, and ultimately back to the first bacterial forms of life
3.5 billion years ago,”165 which is one billion years after Earth and the other planets began
to form around the sun.
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This explanation of the life by the Evolutionary perspective came with new
challenges:166 challenges about the doctrine of creation ex-nihilo167 and challenges about
men and women made in the image of God. The traditional explanation from biblical
literalism can no longer stand. The imago Dei is not created in his actual form, but it is the
product of the evolution of life. And the work of James Watson and Francis Crick on DNA
made the challenge more serious. As all living things are genetically related, why should
the qualification of the imago Dei be attributed only to men and women? Can it be
explained by the increasing brain size, culminating in that of homo sapiens? “With the
development of the human brain, the nature and rate of evolution were permanently altered:
with the introduction of the uniquely human factors of consciousness, intentionality,
freedom and creativity, biological evolution was recast as social and cultural evolution.”168
Continuing to see the difference at the biological level between human beings and
nonhumans, like humans and Apes, seems difficult nowadays.
According to the International Theological Commission, the Big Bang theory does
not contradict the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo because the Big Bang theory does not
“exclude the possibility of an antecedent stage of matter, it can be noted that the theory
appears to provide merely indirect support for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo which can
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only be known by faith.”169 Divine causality can be active in the situation of Big Bang.
Nothing should reduce the Big Bang effect to the atheistic materialist of Neo-Darwinism
which tries to reject the place of the divine providential causality. The evolutionary
mechanism, which is contingent, can also be contingent because God made it contingent.
It states,
With respect to evolution of conditions favorable to the emergence of life, Catholic
tradition affirms that, as universal transcendent cause, God is the cause not only of
existence but also the cause of causes. God’s action does not displace or supplant
the activity of creaturely causes, but enables them to act according to their natures,
and nonetheless, to bring about the ends he intends.170
As it is said, “in the Catholic perspective, neo-Darwinians who adduce random genetic
variation and natural selection as evidence that the process of evolution is absolutely
unguided are straying beyond what can be demonstrated by science.” 171 For the
commission, an evolutionary mechanism is possible only if God has made it. It states,
while science can study these causal chains, it falls to theology to locate this account
of the special creation of the human soul within the overarching plan of the triune
God to share the communion of trinitarian life with human persons who are created
out of nothing in the image and likeness of God, and who, in his name and according
to his plan, exercise a creative stewardship and sovereignty over the physical
universe.172
The imago Dei, as a person of relation and a steward, is called at the ecological
level to care for the world, our common home. In fact, the exploitation and sometimes
destruction of the common home has damaged the universal home in the way that the imago
Dei is at risk in his life. The stewardship or sovereignty of the imago Dei has been criticized
as a cause of the Ecological crisis because Christianity has maximized the place of human
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beings in the Creation and has placed human beings as the ruler of the rest of creation. “The
Genesis account which grants man ‘dominion’ over the earth (Gen 1: 28), has encouraged
the unbridled exploitation of nature by painting him as domineering and destructive by
nature.”173 Even if this is not a correct interpretation of the Bible as understood by the
Church, “it is true that we Christians have at times incorrectly interpreted the Scriptures,
nowadays we must forcefully reject the notion that our being created in God’s image and
given dominion over the earth justifies absolute dominion over other creatures.”174 The
sovereignty or stewardship has been taken as the mark of superiority. The teaching of
Christian beliefs was not to disregard or violate or damage the common home. It was to
care for the rest of creation. This view of care is strongly developed by the current Pope of
the Catholic Church with his encyclical Laudato Si’, which will be evoked in the third
chapter.
Before Pope Francis, John Paul II says during the discourse he gave on January 17,
2001, that “Man’s lordship is not absolute, but ministerial… not the mission of an absolute
and unquestionable master, but of a steward of God’s kingdom.”175 In the same way, he
states in Centesimus Annus “
At the root of senseless destruction of the natural environment lies an
anthropological error, which unfortunately is widespread in our day. Humankind,
which discovers its capacity to transform and in a certain sense create the world
through its own work, forgets that this is always based on God’s prior and original
gift of the things that are.176
He makes it even more clearly in the encyclical Evangelium Vitae “man has a
specific responsibility towards the environment in which he lives, towards the creation
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which God has put at the service of his personal dignity.”177 He continues by affirming that
it is the ecological question “ranging from the preservation of the natural habitats of the
different species of animals and other forms to ‘human ecology’ properly speaking – which
one finds in the Bible a clear and strong ethical direction leading to a solution which
respects every life.”178 In the same way, Pope Benedict in one of his addresses to the Clergy
urges us to realize that creation is harmed every time that “we ourselves have the final
word, where everything is simply our property and we use it for ourselves alone. The
misuse of creation begins when we no longer recognize any higher instance than ourselves,
when we see nothing else but ourselves.”179
Conclusion
In this first chapter, we were asking the question about how to understand the imago
Dei in its history from our context today. Today, The Catechism of the Catholic Church
affirms the uniqueness of the human person as the imago Dei, who, both man and woman,
is a unity of spiritual and corporal, created to be in communion with God and other humans
and to be a steward of creation. From that official teaching, we moved back to the biblical
perspective, where in the Old Testament, the imago Dei refers to the whole person,
undivided and relational, and in the New Testament, the true imago Dei is the imago
Christi. We also explored Peters’ idea that the human person becomes the imago Dei at the
end in imago Christi. Next, we reviewed the concept of the imago Dei from the patristic
and medieval period, where the imago Dei was dissociated from the likeness to God. The
Eastern Christian tradition, by assuming the distinction between body and soul, made the

177

Evangelium Vitae, 42.
Ibid.
179
Address to the Clergy of the Diocese of Bolzano-Bressanone (6 August 2008): AAS 100 (2008), 634.
178

45

distinction between being the image and the likeness of God. The Western Christian
tradition, adopting a structural view, refers the image of God to some human feature given
by God, especially the intellectual nature of the human being. From there, we analyzed the
functionality, or stewardship, and the relational, or communal, dimensions of the imago
Dei. We demonstrated, from the historical analysis of the content attributed to the concept
imago Dei over the centuries, that different ages in the Church have interpreted the content
of that expression in different ways. We can conclude from this historical analysis that the
imago Dei assumes different meanings at different points in history, which is our
justification for expecting that the term is open to ever new meanings. From here, we will
see how the Contemporary Evolution has shaped the new understanding of the emergence
of the human person.
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CHAPTER II: THE EVOLUTIONARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN HUMAN.
One of the most longstanding debates in the field of biological
anthropology is when members of our lineages became
“human.” There is a keen interest in knowing when we evolved
the characteristics seen in our species, and which of these
features truly makes us distinctive from other primates and
especially earlier forms of hominins. Language, culture, tool use,
brain size, and bipedalism have all been cited as traits that
differentiate modern humans from other primate species. While
it was once thought that these traits were uniquely human, we
now understand most of them to be elaborations of similar
features in other species, although with some specific
manifestations for modern humans.180
Introduction
Human beings have been for a long time, if not all the time, preoccupied by the
question of who they are, how they came to be, and what can they say about themselves.
Because by looking at themselves, human beings could see phenotypically that they are
different from nonhumans, that they communicate in a way of which only they are capable,
and that they are the only ones who could transform their environment, it happens that
human beings come to consider themselves as so different and separate from all the other
nonhuman animals. When that separation of human beings from nonhumans was not
explained by the choice that God the Creator made for the human race, it is explained by
some features or characteristics that human beings are the only ones to have. If the scientific
contributions of the past did not contradict that approach to human uniqueness based on
the faculty of reason or the capacity for use of tools, language, or culture, it happens that
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evolutionary science sheds more light on the similarities between human beings and other
livings beings.
Without denying the difference between humans and nonhumans, evolutionary
science has made possible to diminish the massive gap which was thought to separate the
two. The huge influential impact of Charles Darwin made it possible that, after Darwinism
and Neo-Darwinism, evolutionary science developed during the contemporary period a
vast evolutionary contribution, like the Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer; the Eugenics
Movement of Francis Galton; the Sociobiology of Edward O. Wilson; and the Evolutionary
psychology of Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, which can be considered
part of biological evolution. With biological evolution in general, changes or variations are
understood to occur on the genetic level of a population and to be passed on from one
generation to the next. In addition to the change on the genetic level of a population, which
is called microevolution because it is a small-scale change, there is also macroevolution,
which is explained by the idea that all of life is connected and can be traced back to one
common ancestor. This idea of a common ancestor is one of the major foundations on
which the notion of similarities between human species and nonhuman species will be
elaborated. In addition to biological evolution, another important foundation for our
argument will be the cultural evolution, where the evolution of cultures of individuals or
societies helps to recognize some cultural patterns in nonhumans. Also, the analysis of the
emergence of the anatomical modern humans (AMH) will be another foundation for the
notion of similarities and divergences.
In this second chapter, we will begin by emphasizing biological evolution, where
we will develop the major contributions of Darwin and their implications for Neo-
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Darwinism, social Darwinism, the Eugenics movement, and sociobiology theory before
getting to evolutionary psychology. We will continue with the concept of the cultural
evolution, where we will emphasize the integrative evolution, the emergence of the
anatomical modern human, and the similarities and divergences from nonhuman animals,
based on some key genetic adaptations. To finish, we will also acknowledge the recent
contribution of Jurgen Renn on the epistemic evolution which emerges from the cultural
evolution and makes scientific knowledge a specific characteristic of modern humans.
2.1. Biological Evolution
2.1.1. Darwin and Darwinism
As is the case in many theories, a new theory very often includes the responses or
the corrections of the precedent theories. In the case of Darwin also, there were various
contributions which helped Darwinism to situate in the reality of the 19th century. The vast
complexity of living species was obvious to any human being. In the Hellenistic period,
the philosophers were already explaining the biosphere. Aristotle is one of them who
influenced the medieval Catholic thinkers like Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great who
expanded on the biological writings of the Greek philosophers. The classification system
developed by Karl Linnaeus in the 18th century contributed in its own way to the scientific
dynamism in which Darwinism finds itself. As Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett
demonstrated in Evolution from Creation to New Creation, the system of Linnaeus already
used the nomenclature of genus and species but did not question whether the organisms
existed as such from the beginning or had developed from earlier, now extinct forms.181
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During the same 18th century, the idea of the fixity of species was already
challenged. It was challenged by George Leclerc and even Eramus Darwin, grandfather of
Charles Darwin. It was challenged also by Jean Baptiste Lamarck in 1809 in Philosophie
Zoologique, where the controversial approach to evolution of Lamarck was developed.
Despite the fact that his theory of evolution, in which acquired characteristics were
inherited by succeeding generations, was thoroughly discredited, Lamarck has the privilege
to be the first ever to use the term biology as referring to biological science, and the term
invertebrates as referring to the animals without backbones. The works and critics of
Lamarck against fixity makes him one of the first evolutionists of modern science. Charles
Darwin was introduced to the evolutionism of Lamarck through the criticisms of Charles
Lyell against Lamarck. In The Principles of Geology, Lyell argued that “the earth was very
old and had been formed by gradual process and was subjected to natural forces that could
be explained in terms of known scientific mechanisms in operation in the present.” 182 Not
only did Charles Lyell influence Darwin but also William Paley, with his Natural
Theology: Or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity, Collected from the
Appearances of Nature of 1802, influenced Darwin.
Although he studied to become both a physician and a clergyman, Darwin’s
primary interest was natural history (Biology). Due to his studies of biology, Darwin was
able to join the naturalist expedition of HMS Beagle for five years. During his five-year
voyage as naturalist, he observed the variations within individual species in different
locations. From those observations and the voluminous data and research he had
collected—including having read a book by Malthus on human populations competing for
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limited resources—Darwin “had noted the gradual changes in successive generations of
animals when human breeders select for a particular trait. In every population there are
small random variations that can be inherited.”183 With the experiences he gained from this
voyage, Darwin started elaborating the theory of evolutionary change under the force of
natural selection.184 Because animals need to survive, it became a competition that leads to
a natural selection. After emphasizing his new theory in a short paper in 1842 and a longer
one in 1844, Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace presented a similar evolutionary theory
during a meeting of the Linnean Society in 1858. It was after that meeting, in 1859, that
Darwin proceeded to publish the first edition of six of On the Origin of Species.
In his theory of evolution, Darwin not only criticized the idea of fixity, but he
proposed that all living creatures have a common ancestor, which is the descent with
modification model. He introduced the force of natural selection, because for him,
evolution is driven by natural selection. Darwinism is known to have three principles:
variation, conservative force, and struggle for existence. Natural selection is understood as
the results from variation within the members of a species. In other words, natural selection
“operates on heritable differences (variation) among members of a population.”185 In that
sense, when the genetics of some members are suited better to their environment, they are
supposed to survive longer, to reproduce themselves and their successors, and to have a
better life than those whose genes don’t suite the environment. When there is a variation,
it happens at the genotype (which refers to the genetic makeup of an individual) and the
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phenotype (which refers to the morphological and behavioral features of an individual).
The variation may happen “through genetic mutation and, in sexually reproducing
populations, through genetic mutation recombination during meiosis.”

186

But when the

variation happens, it happens in the way that the genotypes that are selectively transmitted
as a result of differential survival and reproduction yield changes in the phenotypes within
the population over time.
Another important point of the evolutionary change by natural selection in
Darwinism is the fact that it is open to the possibility of the formation of new species, and
not only to the change of traits of a species or subspecies. The possibility of the formation
of new species, which is qualified as a speciation is part of the theory of extinction, and
occurs “when variants diverge sufficiently to be no longer capable of interbreeding.”187
There is also gradualism which is understood as the variation or differences between
individuals within a population which arise over time by the accumulation of small
changes.
As with any kind of scientific theory, Darwinism has some critics. Among the
critics, we can identify Thomas Huxley who mentioned that “the natural selection and
gradualism could not account for speciation-the development of new species from existing
species. A species is defined as a reproductively isolated group of individuals who can
interbreed and produce viable and fertile offspring.”188 The second major criticism is the
fact that the Darwinism model for biology lacks solid mechanisms to explain some of the
central features, such as the inheritability of traits and the target for the force of natural
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selection. By the way, the natural selection argument is considered as the tautologic
argument because the survivors are the fittest, or the fittest could only be the survivors. But
against those who criticize the natural selection theory, Michael Ruse argues that their
arguments are not strong enough. For Ruse, the selection depends upon the fact that more
offspring are produced than could survive, and the difference between the survivors and
non-survivors is visible. Because of that difference and the systematic feature observed in
selection, natural selection could not be criticized as tautologic argument.
Using the same logic, Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin established the
Panglossian pseudo-scientific picture of a world in which natural selection produces
everything for the greatest good. And the same Stephen Jay Gould, in collaboration with
Niels Eldredge in 1970, elaborated the “punctuated equilibrium”189 theory in which they
challenged gradualism but agreed on evolutionism. This “punctuated equilibrium” is
defined as “evolution that is characterized by long periods of stability in the
characteristics of an organism and short periods of rapid change during which new forms
appear especially from small subpopulations of the ancestral form in restricted parts of
its geographic range.”190 In other words, punctuated equilibrium is the theory which
stipulates that there have been long periods of stability interrupted by brief periods of
rapid changes. And during the long periods of no change, separated by times of very
rapid change, it seems that nothing proceeds by a smooth, gradual pathway with the
accumulation of small changes.
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In “Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory,” Gould explained
how change is determined by reorganization as well by the selective forces acting on
adult organisms. It also comes out in “punctuated equilibrium” that the extinction of
species is sometimes the result of sudden contingent events, such as the impact of comets
and not only the product of gradual competitive forces.191 Even if these ideas of Gould
and Eldredge received some critiques, especially from Ledyard Stebbins and Francisco
Ayala in “The Evolution of Darwinism,”192 it becomes clear for Neo-Darwinism that
evolutionary changes are viewed as “the product of random variations that were then
selected by the environment. […] The environment selects individuals, but individuals
also select environments, and in a new niche a different set of genes may contribute to
survival.”193 One last important criticism of Darwinism is definitely Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck. Generally, against Darwinism, Lamarck states that the physiological changes
acquired during an organism’s lifetime can be directly inherited. He believed in direct
inheritance of characteristics acquired by individuals during their lifetime. That idea,
however, did not really compete against Darwinism where evolution is explained by the
natural selection coupled with the diversity.
Neo-Darwinism 194 is frequently defined as the theory of evolution that represents
a synthesis of Darwin’s theory in terms of natural selection and modern population
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genetics.195 Neo-Darwinism seems to include the Darwinism model, the Mendelian law
of inheritance (also qualified as the Mendelian genetics) and molecular biology.196
Gregory Mendel, in his law of inheritance, provides an explanation about how
inheritance operates. With Mendel, the inheritance law is no longer the blending of
parental traits. “Mendel employed the essence of the experimental method to derive a
series of statements that argued for the quantitative nature of inheritance and, most
important, for the particulate nature of the heritable principle—what came to be called
the gene.”197 The work of Mendel has helped to explain the transmission of traits
intergenerationally.
With molecular biology, the contribution of Miescher in 1869 on DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) as part of chromosomes with protein became one of the most
important elements of the evolutionary theory to explain variation as differences in the
sequences of the four nitrogen-containing bases that make up the molecule of DNA in
the nucleus of the cell. The contribution of Miescher helps to explain mutation as a result
of the changes in the physical appearances or performances of the organism. 198 In the
same way, the contribution of the studies of the DNA molecule by James Watson199 in
1953 and Francis Crick200 helped to establish the model of the DNA structure and to
indicate the common origin that all living things share. In fact, “in all known organisms,
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the same genetic code is used to translate from DNA to amino acid.”201 The comparison of
the molecular structure of similar proteins in different species has shown that “in rhesus
monkeys, only one of these amino acids is different; horses have twelve that differ and fish
have twenty-two.”202 The assumption of Neo-Darwinism203 is that “long-term evolutionary
changes are the result of the gradual accumulation of many small changes.”204
Molecular biology, especially the DNA discovery, is fundamentally a support to
the Darwinism theory on two points. “First, a mechanism for the production of variations
in the population could be imagined. Second, the fact that such variations take place one
DNA base at a time gives definition to the principle of graduation that is also a critical
part of the theory.”205 Neo-Darwinism has seen the development within itself of Social
Darwinism, Sociobiology, and Evolutionary psychology.
2.1.2. Social Darwinism – Eugenic movement - Sociobiology – Evolutionary
Psychology
Social Darwinism
Social Darwinism begins fundamentally with the work of Herbert Spencer206
(1820-1903). His idea is that “one could develop an overriding philosophy that
subsumed all of the sciences, including sociology and psychology, under the aegis of
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the evolutionary model.”207 For that, he advocated for a societal system which are
subject to the same Darwinian laws of natural selection as plants and animals. “At the
heart of his proposal was the idea that the individual has preeminence and that society
evolves as the sum of the individuals within it.”208 This idea supported “the absence of
governmental intervention to assist those less able to compete, as well as justification
for the laissez-faire capitalism of John Stuart Mill.”209 In other words, the greater good
of the society will be achieved if it is allowed the freedom to act.
Reflecting on the law of the jungle and what could happen to the unfit, Spencer
states that “the whole effort of nature is to get rid of such, to clear the world of them and
to make room for better… It is best that they should die.”210 This idea seems to
accommodate capitalism’s defenders and the middle and upper class. Against Spencer,
Thomas Huxley (1825-1895) replied by demonstrating how we can transcend our
biological roots. For him, “the conscience of man revolts against the moral indifference
of nature.”211 While “Spencer’s survival of the fittest yielded to nature blood ‘red in
tooth and claw’ […] Huxley, in contrast to Spencer, envisioned a society governed by
caring values that mark an evolutionary advancement from beyond where we have
come.”212
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Eugenics movement
The Eugenics movement of Francis Galton213 (1822-1911) is fundamentally the
belief that influencing the evolutionary trajectory of the individuals will lead to the
improvement of the society. It is a belief that humanity could be improved through
selective breeding. In Hereditary Genius214 and his autobiography, Memory of My Life,
Galton gives more details about eugenics:
This is precisely the aim of Eugenics. Its first object is to check the birth-rate of
the Unfit, instead of allowing them to come into being, though doomed in large
numbers to perish prematurely. The second object is the improvement of the race
by furthering the productivity of the Fit by early marriages and healthful rearing
of their children. Natural Selection rests upon excessive production and
wholesale destruction; Eugenics on bringing no more individuals into the world
than can be properly cared for, and those only of the best stock.215
With his eugenic view, Galton considers that the Western European civilization
is the pinnacle of evolutionary achievement. In Hereditary Genius, Galton compared the
civilized world of his own culture, the white Anglo-Saxon British Empire, to the negro
race. As Peter and Hewlett point out, Galton concludes in his comparison that “the
average intellectual standard of the negro race is some two grades below our own.”216
The approach of Galton is even called positive eugenics because negative eugenics
which is found in USA and Germany217 seems to call for the elimination of those who
are Unfit from the breeding population while positive eugenics called for the racial
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increasing of the population of the Fit. In the 20th century in America, the sterilization
laws and marriage laws, which reinforced the prohibition against interracial marriage,
are all justified somehow by the negative eugenics. In the same way, it reinforces the
nationalism and anti-Semitism of the Nazism of Germany led by Adolph Hitler, where
by looking for the purification of the Aryan race, Nazism decided deliberately to
exterminate people of Jewish heritage as persons with unfit genes.
Sociobiology
Neo-Darwinism also provided the foundation for the Sociobiology which was
developed by Edward O. Wilson (1929…). Sociobiology is traditionally defined by the
systematic study of the biological basis of social behavior. It is an attempt to understand
and explain animal and human behavior in the light of natural selection and other
biological processes. Sociobiology offers a contribution to a better understanding of
animal social behavior and altruistic behavior in some animal species.218 In his book
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, Wilson, based on the social behavior of animals
combined with the Neo-Darwinist understanding of population and genes, makes
conclusions about the social behavior of humans. Human behavior is understood to be
based on the traits that are genetically subject to natural selection.219
Among the important themes that assist Sociobiology to explain human behavior
are the concepts of selfish genes, which was provided by Richard Dawkins, and genetic
reductionism and genetic determinism. The genes are understood as a driven force which
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permits the next generation to exist. It is even said that “what we know as human
consciousness and human culture are the means the genes employ to ensure their
continuance from one generation to the next.”220 Because of that, Wilson believes that
“the chicken is only an egg’s way of making another egg,” or in other words, “the
organism is only DNA’s way of making more DNA.”221
Believing in genetic selfishness, sociobiologists believe that “culture is reducible
to a genetic analysis of evolutionary adaptation.”222 Thus everything in culture serves
reproductive fitness, which in different ways means that values, ethics, and religions
serve the selfish genes interest. Wilson states that “the genes hold culture on a leash […]
The leash is very long, but inevitably values will be constrained in accordance with their
effects on the human gene pool.”223 Sociobiologists believe also that “they can explain
human xenophobia against strangers and altruism toward relatives, because both are
expressions of the selfish gene’s desire to replicate.”224
But “instead of an ethic of individual survival, Wilson says society ought to
embrace altruism and cooperation.”225 For Wilson, the selfish gene does not mean that
human beings will be move to tribalism or xenophobia but we are called to support
modern liberal values and altruism. It can sound contradictory to put selfish genes and
altruism together, but Wilson and Richard Dawkins did not support the idea of negative
eugenics. Wilson did not seem to approve the holocaust and we guess in the same way
that he did not approve slavery and colonization. And Dawkins emphasized how
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selfishness promotes altruistic social behavior.226 “Dawkins maintains that it is our genes
that control what we do.”227 In The Selfish Gene, Dawkins states that the argument of
his book is “that we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes.” He also
adds that he “shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene
is ruthless selfishness.” 228
Sociobiology has been a controversial discipline because of its attempts to
explain various human social behaviors in terms of their adaptive value for reproduction.
Sociobiologists are accused of attributing adaptive value to various widespread but
morally objectionable behaviors by justifying them as natural or inevitable.229
Sociobiology is criticized because of the lack of empirical studies on the connection
between human genes and human behavior.
Evolutionary psychology
From the debate about sociobiology, a new discipline was constituted called
evolutionary psychology. The website of the Center for Evolutionary Psychology at the
University of California Santa Barbara states,
The goal of research in evolutionary psychology is to discover and understand
the design of the human mind. Evolutionary psychology is an approach to
psychology, in which knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are
put to use in research on the structure of the human mind. It is not an area of
study, like vision, reasoning, or social behavior. It is a way of thinking about
psychology that can be applied to any topic within it. In this view, the mind is a
set of information-processing machines that were designed by natural selection
to solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gathered ancestors. This way of
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thinking about the brain, mind, and behavior is changing how scientists approach
old topics, and opening up new ones230
This new field was concretized first with The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary
Psychology and the Generation of Culture231 of Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and
John Tooby, who are three of the leading scholars in this very active field of evolutionary
psychology. In recent history, different approaches to the evolutionary psychology,
which can be defined as the evolution of mind and behavior, have been developed, where
the relation between the mental qualities and the species is scrutinized. In fact, Darwin
himself examined in The Descent of Man and in The Expression of the Emotions in Man
and Animals the “mental faculties and the qualities in human and nonhuman animals,
and argued for the gradual development of human mentality from ancestral primates.”232
Under the influence of the intellectual work of Darwin, Hiram Stanley published in 1895
his Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling, which encouraged various scholars like Francis
Galton, George Romanes, C. Lloyd Morgan, William James, John Dewey, and James
Baldwin to deepen the evolution of mind theory and its application within psychology.
While Romanes and Morgan were developing a comparative psychology for studying
mental or psychical evolution, James developed functionalism and Dewey held that
“Darwin’s conception of emotion required adjustment in light of James’s theories.”233
Among the first prominent figures of evolutionary psychology we could note the
evolutionary biologists like George Gaylord Simpson, Ernst Mayr, and Julian Huxley;
the paleontologists Edwin Colbert and Alfred Romer; the comparative psychologists
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Harry Harlow and Henry Nissen; the psychobiologist and physiological psychologist
Karl Pribram and Roger Sperry; the physical anthropologist Sherwood Washburn; and
cultural anthropologists like Margaret Mead.
The question of how the mind and especially how the human mind evolved has
continued to be the preoccupation of some scholars through the 20th century. Harry J.
Jerison in 1973 with his Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence was scrutinizing “the
fossil evidence for interspecific differences in brain size together with evidence of
ancient environments and selection pressures in studying the evolution of intelligence
from an information-processing point of view.”234 In the same way, Philip Lieberman in
1975 with his On the origins of Language conducted research on the evolution of
language, and Robert Aubrey Hinde in 1983 with Ethology combined ethology and
comparative psychology and animal behavior, acknowledging the need for a cognitive
perspective. It was because of the inspiration by ethology and his interest for social
organization of insects that Wilson founded the sociobiology which held that “social
behavior can be explained in terms of inclusive fitness, kin selection, and reciprocal
altruism-selection pressures operating on closely related individuals or on population
members that aid one another.”235
At this point, there are five principles which are recognized to be the principles
of evolutionary psychology. Peters and Hewlett synthetize these principles beautifully
in this way,
Principle 1. The brain is a physical system. It functions as a computer. Its circuits
are designed to generate behavior that is appropriate to your environmental
circumstances.
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Principle 2. Our neural circuits were designed by natural selection to solve
problems that our ancestors faced during our species’ evolutionary history.
Principle 3. Consciousness is just the tip of the iceberg; most of what goes on in
your mind is hidden from you. As a result, your conscious experience can mislead
you into thinking that our circuitry is simpler than it really is. Most problems that
you experience as easy to solve are very difficult to solve—they require
complicated neural circuitry.
Principle 4. Different neural circuits are specialized for solving different adaptive
problems.
Principle 5. Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind.236
When evolutionary psychologists are confronted with the question of how human
behavior is the product of one’s genes, the first thing that they take into consideration is
the fact that the human brain in the modern period is “the product of selective forces
exerted on our Stone Age ancestors.”237 The second point is that human beings in the
modern period are “descendants of those who were subject to the Environment of
Evolutionary Adaptedness”238 without a clarification on the specific time in which it
happened. “The idea is that our ancestors were selected for behavior that would have
survival and reproductive advantage for their genes. As a result, modules of our brain
contain features that exhibit these behaviors.”239
While it became obvious that there are some components of human behavior that
are related to the genes that underlie the structure of our nervous system, it seems evident
that human behavior is not only determined by the genes, but also by our choice and/or
our free will. For Peters and Hewlett, “it is clear that the Christian perspective is not
limited to understanding humans as merely the sum of their genes and the physical
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structures these genes determine.”240 And they continue by affirming the fact that we
human beings see ourselves as “so much more than that. Our concept of ourselves as
created in the image of God, […] imago Dei, means that we have a wider and, […] richer
view of anthropology and psychology.”241 It is said that “the human soul, whatever we
think that might be, is not, in the Christian view, only so much neural wiring in the
brain.”242
In the same way, Peters and Hewlett state, “if Wilson, Dawkins and the
evolutionary psychologists are correct, then all human activity is simply a product of
our evolutionary past and has no real significance beyond the survival value it conferred
on our ancestors.”243 And it is quite clear that all human activity is not the product of
past evolution. It goes beyond that and has some significance. However, we can
recognize that Darwinism, Neo-Darwinism, Social evolution, the Eugenics movement,
Sociobiology and Evolutionary psychology, as part of the biological evolutionary
science, were preoccupied by the evolution of human being from the past, if not from
its origin to the future. Understanding the evolution of human species involves somehow
redefining the whole different component branches of human realities, like redefining
the divine action and the cultural evolution of human species and other species. It is in
that way that some researchers direct their preoccupation for the evolution of human
being in connection to human mind, brain, and culture.
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2.2. Cultural evolution
2.2.1. The recognition of cultural evolution to nonhumans
The evolutionary science was not only biological. The contemporary
evolutionary science has seen the development of the cultural evolution. 244 In 2007 that
the University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology encouraged
research that led to new understanding about human culture, and to more clarification
about human societies and their interrelations with the other species. From that
conference, the participants sought to “understand the origins of the human mind and of
its biological substrate, the human brain and including the mind’s expression in and
formation by human culture.”245 In their various contributions, these scholars did not
share a single theoretical perspective, but they converged on some points. “They
acknowledge the need to bring all potential sources of evidence and theory to bear on
the problem of hominin cognitive and cultural evolution, including archeological,
environmental, cultural anthropological, and comparative perspectives.” 246
Against the traditional belief that the capacity to develop culture is distinctively
human, because human beings could be the only ones to possess the capacities or
abilities to pass attitude, skills, belief, or knowledge to other, there is another belief
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which affirms that other animal species also possess cultural traditions. 247 By defining
culture as something socially transmitted and group-differential traditions within a
species, it became clear that some nonhuman animals possess culture, even if human
cultural processes and achievements remain distinctive for the researchers of Evolution
of Mind, Brain, and Culture. But our point in affirming the culture of nonhuman animals
is to question with scientific arguments whether we can continue to consider human
beings as the only ones who have culture.
The mechanism by which cultural evolution operates is compared to the
mechanism of natural selection, in the sense that the variation in the case of cultural
evolution is understood as the social transmission. It is said that the selective retention
between generations is applied to the retention of the advantageous elements of the
culture. And the “innovations that are advantageous in a given environment and that are
socially transmitted because they are advantageous are more heavily represented in the
next generation.”248 Cultural evolution is not necessarily genetic evolution or biological
evolution. It is the evolution which can happen in the absence of biological evolution,
but which brings some changes in human and nonhuman animals’ behaviors. Cultural
evolution can also be gene-based evolution but not analogous to gene transmission.
When it is gene-based, evolution uses genes as a model for the cultural evolution.
Richard Dawkins in 1976 was supportive of cultural evolution based on genetics with
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his notion of “meme” which is considered as the unit of cultural evolution. However,
his view did not find many supporters.
For culture to be transmitted from one generation to another one, there are four
forms which allow the social transmission or social learning to occur. The first form is
the location, in the way that the attention of the learner draws on the environment. The
second is a desire to emulate, as when a chimpanzee sees that another has attained food
by using a stick and seeks to use the stick to achieve the same outcome. The third is
imitation, meaning the copying of precise motor procedures. And the fourth is the active
intervention of the teacher on the learner in order to improve the performance of the
learner.249
The recognition of culture in nonhuman animals seems to come from the
observations that some populations exhibit distinctive behaviors in comparison with
other populations of the same species. It comes also from their social learning. And the
“evidence of socially transmitted traditions has been found in birds, dolphins, whales,
and anthropoid primates, among others.”250 Even if nonhuman animals or our ancestors
like the Homo heidelbergensis or Homo ergaster could not think, plan, use complex
languages, and control complex motor skills like in the case of human beings, the
behavioral difference between different groups of the same species and social learning
can be taken as a demonstration of the interrelatedness or interconnectedness between
nonhuman animals and humans.
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The participants in the research on the evolution of mind, brain, and culture in
2007 claimed that while animals can change their environments to their benefit, or use
calls to warn or inform conspecifics, or use tools, human beings “mold their
environments more profoundly, improve their tools through cultural transmission,
engage in social cooperation, develop cultural categories, and conceptions of the world,
and pass on systems of belief and knowledge in unprecedented ways.”251 Because of the
sharing of not only genetic evolution but also cultural evolution, we can extend the
interconnectedness or interrelationship between nonhuman animals and human beings.
2.2.2. Integrative Evolution
One of the recent approaches to the evolution of mind and culture has been the
integrative approach to evolution where psychology—meaning the cognitive,
comparative and developmental view of mind—has been integrated with neuroscience,
evolutionary biology, archaeology, paleoanthropology, genetics, and geology, which
leads to the cultural evolution. With his works, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three
Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cognition252 and A Mind So Rare: The Evolution
of Human Consciousness,253 Merlin Donald contributes greatly to the integrative
evolution by reviewing “evidence from psychology, neuroscience, paleontology, and
archaeology.”254 His two books are not only a big contribution to the integrative
evolution but they are also a big contribution to the question of the evolution of hominin
cognition and the development of the uniqueness (the unique characteristics) of modern
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humans, which we will develop more when we will explore the emergence of modern
humans.
In Origins of the Modern Mind, Donald concludes that “the main biological
changes in hominin cognition occur in motor skill and memory and that further changes
are cultural.”255 He came to this conclusion after presenting an impressive collection of
neurological, anthropological, and psychological information about the human brain and
cognition and how it differs from those of other primates. Donald conceives four stages
which explain the evolution of human cognition, the evolution where humans progressed
from other primates by developing gestural, linguistic, written storage, and thought
structures. The first stage refers to the cognitive structure of the common ancestor256
which is episodic, where chimpanzees and other anthropoids perceive and remember but
have poor autorecall because the only representational form of memory available to
them is the memory of specific events. The second stage, called the mimetic stage, refers
to the capacity of representation which is attributed to Homo erectus, who underwent “a
fundamental cognitive shift that set them apart from all other primates including
Australopithecus and Homo habilis.”257 According to Donald, Homo erectus developed
sophisticated tools, spread across vast territory and varied climates, and developed
“society where cooperation and social coordination of action were central to the species
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survival strategy.”258 This second, or mimetic, stage259 occurred through changes in the
ability to plan and execute motor sequences, and ability for imitation, planning, and
autocuing of motor skills. The mimetic stage is not explained by the increase of brain
size.
The third stage is the mythic stage, where the development of complex language
is possible, even if Donald “contends that the language ability must spring from prelinguistic, mimetic representations, which he locates in systems of gesture and the
perceptual abilities that guide them and read them.”260 According to Donald, the mythic
culture is symbolic and appears later than speech. He argues that the hunting and fertility
images found in southern Europe were used “to explore and develop the mythic ideas
that were already the governing cognitive constructs of human society.”261 “Symbolic
art, in Donald's view, is handled by the same cognitive system that handles symbolic
language, although he clearly shows that language and visual processing take place in
separate places in the brain. Humans would later synthesize symbolic art and symbolic
language.”262
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The fourth stage refers to the cultural development where writing is the main
characteristic. After the biological evolution regarding the second and the third stage,
Donald refers to the final stage of the human cognition as the theoretic culture, where
visuosymbolic invention is possible.263 By contrast “with the oral-mythic culture of
earlier H. sapiens, this new stage brings new cognitive manifestations through graphic
invention (image-making, symbol-making, script-making), the resultant external
memory […] and theory construction.”264 In his contribution, “Mimesis Theory ReExamined, Twenty Years after the Fact,” Donald reexamines the conception of mimesis,
which is really important in his theory of the hominin development. It is nice to
recognize that he was also open to the social intelligence theory where “the increasing
size of the social group requires an increased capacity for representing members of the
group and their relations, and, ultimately, for sharing knowledge through mimetic
exchange.”265 In his interest in hominin cognitive evolution, Donald used not only the
integrative approach but he posits enhanced motor control and memory capacity as the
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gateway to representational meta-cognition and the ability to teach and learn, which
yields culture as the engine of cognitive development. 266
In A Mind So Rare, which Donald wrote a decade after the Origins of the Modern
Mind, he continues to deal with the evolutionary accounts of human cognitive capacity
with the integrative evolution approach. He argues in this book for the presence of a
strong consciousness as one of the most important attributes of the human mind. He
begins this book by clarifying his view of consciousness. He describes consciousness at
the functional level, rather than providing an evolutionary account or a full description
of how neurological activity produces consciousness. 267 However, as a neuroscientist,
he builds this functional model upon facts about the brain. He aims for an inclusive view
of consciousness as “a multilayered, multifocal capacity and a deep, enduring cognitive
system with roots far back in evolution.”268 For Donald, the words “consciousness” or
“awareness” encompass many phenomena. The first are mental states such as sleep,
wakefulness, and alertness. Second, consciousness is a central executive in the mind -- a
self-regulating high-level processor that receives input from many sources, examines it,
and directs action based on analysis. This form of consciousness is what is generally called
thought or understanding. Functionally, such consciousness’ domain is general processing
power, attention, and general-purpose skill that can be brought to bear on unfamiliar or
complex tasks. Finally, the third form of consciousness “has more to do with
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enlightenment, or illumination, than with mere attention,” playing upon human symbolic
capacity rather than just attention.
Consciousness is understood as quantitative and not as something that some have
and some do not have. The nonhumans can be more or less conscious. Their conscious
capacity can support more or less information. They can handle problems of varying levels
of complexity. They may have the first form of consciousness but not the other two, and
so on. With this backdrop, Donald allows many animals into ‘the Consciousness club,’
starting with creatures like ants and bees, which can construct a representation of the world
divorced from their immediate sensory input. At progressively higher levels of
consciousness are fish and vertebrates, birds, mammals, primates, and humans. Further,
not all humans share the same level of consciousness, and a child becomes more conscious
as he or she develops.
Donald also presents the evolution of human consciousness. He groups the
constituents of consciousness in three levels of awareness. The first, associated with the
sensory cortex, is binding or perceptual unity, the ability to combine perceptions to
perceive complex phenomena like objects and events. This is the domain of raw feeling.
The second is developed with the secondary cortex. It is the domain of short-term memory
and control, where the birds and mammals have a sense of time and can focus on both an
immediate perception and something which is out of sight but no longer out of mind. Such
animals can also use their conscious power to learn new skills. The third is associated with
the tertiary cortex, which is typical for humans and other primates. We are able to maintain
intermediate-term awareness, at the level of minutes or hours. We are able to perceive,
dissect, and act upon very complex situations and events, and several of them at once.

74

However, for Donald, this third level is not enough for symbolic thought and culture.
Humans departed from their primate cousins by developing a superplastic brain and
complex webs of culture, neither of which can feasibly exist without the other. Deep or
cognitive enculturation is thus added to genes and environment as a driving factor of
development. The two last chapters of A Mind So Rare present a condensed version of the
four stages of human cognition with an eye toward consciousness. With these two books,
we could see how greatly Donald has contributed to the integrative evolution and the
clarification on the uniqueness of modern humans.
Another integrative work in evolution is the work of Steven Mithen where he
combined archeological, paleontological, and psychological studies.269 He sought to
infer the evolution of psychological mechanisms from changes in toolmaking, patterns
of hunting and gathering, and social structures. Mithen identifies four categories of
intelligence (social – natural history – technical – linguistic) which are in the hominin
line. For the evolution of mammalian and primates’ minds, Mithen evokes three forms
of intelligence. The first is general intelligence for nonprimate mammals. The second is
central intelligence which fall under the four categories. And the third is cognitive
fluidity which is specific to modern humans. Mithen argues that modern human
intelligence is not modularly isolated but creatively combines knowledge and abilities
across domains. In hominin development, Mithen demonstrates that while Homo habilis
possesses social intelligence, Homo ergaster has the technical intelligence, and the
Neanderthals have “increased natural history, technical, and social intelligence, with
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language being parasitic on and largely limited to social intelligence.” 270 In his
contribution “The Cathedral Model for the Evolution of Human Cognition,” 271 Mithen
emphasizes his view of human cognitive fluidity which allows for the beginning of
history, or the cumulative development of events and knowledge, including cultural
identities that are expressed in artifact traditions.
Felix Warneken, professor in the department of Psychology at Harvard
University, examines the helping behavior in chimpanzees and young children in
relation to shared intentions. 272 He demonstrates that while chimpanzees are capable of
instrumental helping behavior, only humans can show genuine collaboration in
coordinated activities to achieve a goal, with differentiated individual roles and a
realization that both parties are seeking the same outcome. For Warneken, the shared
goals and shared intentions are unique to humans. He discusses this finding in the
context of the possibility that group selection has yielded the human ability for shared
intentions.
Other evolutionists who have adopted the integrative evolutionist approach are
Peter Richerson from the Environmental Science and Policy department of UC Davis
and Robert Boyd of the department of Anthropology of UC Los Angeles. Both are
concerned with the origins of the capacity for culture. In their contribution “Rethinking
Paleoanthropology: A world Queerer Than We supposed,” both apply their models to
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the evolution of cognition and culture. They stress the changing character of
environmental circumstances over the past 14 million years, especially the 2.5 million
years in which the genus Homo has existed. Both demonstrate that different cognitive
strategies or different cognitive mechanisms would be favored by different rates of
environment change in the sense that long periods of environmental stability would
favor the evolution of innate cognitive mechanisms. But in the case of our hominin
ancestors, such stability was not possible because of the rapid changes. Both argued then
that cognitive flexibility would be favored over innate fixity. For them “the mechanisms
for such flexibility include imitative learning and tribe-oriented values, which might be
subject to group selection.”273
The other important contributions to integrative evolution are the work of Kim
Sterelny from Australian National University in the School of Social Sciences, Peter
Gärdenfors in Cognitive Science at Lund University, and Philip Chase from the
Pennsylvania Museum at the University of Pennsylvania. While Sterelny274 emphasizes
the importance of the evolution of cognitive bases for cooperation in the hominin line,
Gärdenfors275 focuses on the sensory, motor, and cognitive differences between humans

Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd, “Rethinking Paleoanthropology: A world Queerer Than We
supposed,” in Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 263-302. Cf. Hatfield, 41.
274
Kim Sterelny, “Human Behavioral Ecology, Optimality, and Human Action,” in Evolution of Mind,
Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum
of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 303-324.
275
Peter Gärdenfors, “The Role of Cooperation in the Evolution of Protolanguage and Language,” in
Evolution of Mind, Brain, and Culture, ed. Gary Hatfield and Holly Pittman (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Museum of Archeology and Anthropology, 2013), 193-216. For Gärdenfors, the key cognitive
differences are in imagination, planning, mindreading, self-consciousness, and linguistic abilities. Being
able to plan or to have a mental stimulation, are recognized as the new hominin capacities. The “ability
for intersubjective cognition underlies hominin symbolic behavior and the evolution of cooperation.” 275
And he makes a clear distinction between the indirect reciprocity (the fact to be helped by someone else)
and the intersubjectivity needed for shared intentions and future planning which occurs with the
protolanguage, while the indirect reciprocity requires full predicative language. In Hatfield, 41.
273

77

and nonhominin anthropoids, and Chase seeks to demonstrate that the social codes
created by human culture is one of the unique things about human culture. He examines
the distinctive features of culture as a group and recounts the evidence for the timing of
its evolution.276 These are some of the integrative evolutionists who have contributed
not only to the research on evolution of mind, brain, and culture but also to the research
on the evolution of species and the evolution of modern humans.
2.3. Emergence of anatomically modern humans (AMH)277
Focusing on the fundamental question of the unique distinctive characteristic of
human being, Theodore Schurr from the department of Anthropology of the University
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worldviews arose later.” Cf. Hatfield, 43.
277
According to International Union for Geologic Sciences based on the redating of a geologic, from the
first unicellular organism (eukaryotes), which is estimated between 4-3.5 billion years ago (bya), the
evolutionary pathways leads through the first multicellular (the ediacara fauna) which is estimated
between 800 and 600 million years ago (mya), and to the separation from the other major branch of
animals, which includes mollusks, arthropods and some worms in 550 mya; all these periods are referred
to as the “Precambrian” period. The evolutionary pathway leads also to the development of chordates in
525 mya; and to the constitution of vertebrates with a spinal cord surrounded by segmented vertebrae in
518 mya; and to development of amphibians in 370 mya; and to the development of mammal which are
like reptiles in 320 mya; all these periods of the evolutionary development are referred as the “Paleozoic”
period.
From there, the evolutionary pathway leads to the “Mesozoic” period which is composed of the
constitution of true mammals and dinosaurs between 220 and 120 mya; and to constitution of the first
birds in 160 mya; and to the development of the first placental mammals in 120 mya. After the Mesozoic
period, there was the “Cenzoic” period which began with the first primates around 65.5 mya; while the
primates with modern aspects are estimated to occur around 55 mya; and the first anthropoid primates
are estimated to exist between 50 and 45 mya; and the first Apes which are distinct from the Old World
Monkeys are estimated around 30-20 mya; and the first hominins are estimated for 7-5 mya.
To get to the Homo sapiens in Africa, the modern studies to which Hatfield refers show that the
primary line of descent for Homo sapiens is from the Australopiths around 6 mya which are the first
bipedalism in the first hominins, to the Homo Habilis between 2.5 and 1.6 mya; to the Homo ergaster
which is the African form of Homo erectus in 1.8-0.7 mya, from which the Asian form of Homo erectus
happened to evolve around 500 thousand years ago (kya). The African form of Homo erectus called Homo
ergaster gave form to the Homo heidelbergensis also identified as Homo rhodesiensis around 600 kya
which is now considered the common ancestor to Homo neanderthalensis (400-28 kya) in Eurasia and

78

of Pennsylvania began his reflection “When Did We Become Human?” by
acknowledging the fact that “language, culture, tool use, brain size, and bipedalism have
been cited as traits that differentiate modern humans from other primate species.”278 If
it was once thought that these characteristics were the traits of human beings, he states
that “we now understand most of them to be elaborations of similar features in other
species, although with some specific manifestations for modern humans.”279 Not only is
it recognized in chimpanzees and great apes that they have culture and that they have
some 30 different behaviors like anting, greeting gestures, and reconciliation which are
part of cultural patterns, 280 and that they can make use of tools,281 but it is also recognized
that they have emerging language abilities282 to comprehend and manipulate symbols
and communicate emotions, 283 even if they cannot make use of complex language. It has
also been recognized by some scholars that the emergence of human language is
probably found in the manual gestures, facial expressions, and vocal signals of

Homo sapiens which is also called anatomically modern humans (AMH) around 200 kya in Africa. At
this point, the Neanderthals are considered as the cousins of the Homo sapiens and no longer as parents
of them, and both of them shared the same ancestor, Homo ergaster, with Homo erectus of Asia.
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chimpanzees and bonobos or gorillas.284 These various pieces of evidence of sharing of
culture or cultural patterns “diminish the assertion of modern human uniqueness, despite
clear quantitative differences between Homo sapiens and other primate species.”285
The genetic variation in humans and other primates helps us to see the
anatomical, behavioral, and cognitive differences and similarities between them. The
studies or the comparison of the human genome with that of other primates like apes and
chimpanzees provide serious information about the evolution of modern humans and
about the phylogenetic relationships among primate species, and reveal the major
moments of selection which help to explain the anatomical, behavioral, and cognitive
differences. As Theodore Schurr states in “When Did We Become Human?,” the
“difficulty in finding a direct line linking earlier hominins with modern humans means
that we must examine evidence for the emergence of human traits across the entire
hominin lineage, and within the primate order, as well.”286 Before the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR)287 method, which was developed in 1983 by Kary Mullis, an American
biochemist, to analyze genetic variation, there was the chromosomal banding method288
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where “researchers characterized chromosomal banding patterns and compared
segmental positions in different primate species to understand phylogenetic and
functional differences between them.”289 These studies on genetic variation, the
chromosomal banding method, and the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) did not
“generate direct genealogical insights into the phylogenetic relationships between
species as do studies of single copy nuclear genes or uniparentally inherited genetic
systems, such as the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) or the Y-chromosome.”290 However,
in large part due to recombination and other rearrangements that have taken place over
many millions of years, it is recognized that these studies have demonstrated that
between humans, chimpanzees, and apes, there is a “relative similarity of the genomes
of these species, and identified sorts of evolutionary processes that they have
experienced over the past 10-20 million years.”291

1. Primate cladogram based on chromosomal
banding patterns. Cf. Theodore G. Schurr, Fig.2.3.

of species with no more than slight modifications. Following the introduction of Q-branding by Casperson
and his colleagues in 1968, Pardue and Gall inadvertently produced differential staining of heterochromatin,
leading to C-banding, and in 1971 G-banding was discovered by several authors. In general, there are too
many branding techniques, to be mentioned individually. Cf. A. T. Sumner,
“Chromosome Banding Pattern” ScienceDirect https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/biochemistrygenetics-and-molecular-biology/chromosome-banding-pattern 2001, (accessed Mar 11, 2020).
289
Schurr, 56.
290
Ibid.
291
Ibid.

81

This cladogram based on chromosome banding patterns shows a significant
change in chromosome structure over the past 14-25 million years, including fusions,
and inversions. From the Old World Monkeys, which are Macaques and Baboons,
Vervets and Guenons, and Leaf Monkeys, the “Gibbons have undergone tremendous
chromosome rearrangements, and they also show a range of karyotypes, while the
branch leading to the orangutan and African apes has undergone two fissions to produce
the 48-chromosome karyotype.”292 And “in the human lineage, there has been a fusion
of two chromosomes present in chimpanzees and other primates to create the human
chromosome 2, thereby reducing the human karyotype to 2n=46.”293 From the
perspective of the cytogenetic and molecular data, there have been genomic
rearrangements more frequently during primate genome evolution. And this genomic
rearrangement can explain the DNA differences between the human species and the
ape’s and chimpanzee’s species, because it could have played a role in the gene
expression of each species.
To elaborate the exact implications of the chromosomal expansion for selection
and adaption in the human and chimp lineages, the model of nuclear gene variation has
been used to reconstruct phylogenetic relationships of humans and hominid ape species.
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2. A phylogeny showing the evolutionary relationships
between different hominoid species. The numbers indicate
estimated millions of years (myr) from the last branch point to
the present along particular lineages. The time estimates are
based on both fossil evidence and genetic data from the species
represented in the tree. Cf. Theodore G. Schurr, Fig.2.5.

With various nuclear gene sequences, it has been possible to reconstruct a
phylogenetic relationship of humans and hominoid ape species. In that reconstruction,
the human-chimpanzees lineage is separated from the Gorillas lineage. The human and
chimpanzees and Bonobos separation are later than the separation of Humans and
Gorillas, Orangutans, and Gibbons. In a “study of four genomic regions from human,
chimp, gorilla, and orangutan comprising ~2 million base pairs, […] estimate the
human-chimp speciation event at 4.1 ± 0.4 mya and fairly large ancestral effective
population sizes (65,000 ± 30,000 for the human-chimp ancestor).”294 After the
speciation between human and gorilla, it is noted in the studies conducted in 2007 by
Hobolth and Christensen, et al., “Genomic Relationships and Speciation Times of
Human, Chimpanzees, and Gorilla Inferred from a Coalescent Hidden Markov
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Model,”295 that approximately half of the human genome coalesced with chimpanzee.
According to Patterson, and Richter et al., in “Genetic Evidence for Complex Speciation
of Humans and Chimpanzees,”296 the short divergence between humans and
chimpanzees on the X chromosomes can be explained by an interspecific hybridization
even in the ancestry of these two species.
To study the genomic divergences between humans and other hominoids, FengChi Chen and Wen-Hsiung Li, in “Genomic Divergences between Humans and Other
Hominoids and the Effective Population Size of the Common Ancestor of Humans and
Chimpanzees,” selected 53 autosomal intergenic non-repetitive DNA segments from the
human genome and sequenced them in a human, a chimpanzee, a gorilla, and an
orangutan. “The average sequence divergence was only 1.24% ± 0.07% for the humanchimpanzee pair, 1.62% ± 0.08% for the human-gorilla pair, and 1.63% ± 0.08% for the
chimpanzee-gorilla pair.”297 And “the average sequence divergences between orangutans
and humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas were 3.08% ± 0.11%, 3.12% ± 0.11%, and 3.09%
± 0.11%.”298 These estimations, which were confirmed by additional data from GenBank,
are substantially lower than previous ones, which included repetitive sequences and might
have been based on less-accurate sequence data.299 When these DNA segments were
subjected to phylogenetic analysis, they strongly supported the Homo-Pan clade. It states
that “the neighbor-joining tree derived from the concatenated sequence of the 53
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segments—24,234 bp in length—supports the Homo-Pan clade with a 100% bootstrap
value.”300
Several studies conducted by the Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium
have noted that “X-linked genes are significantly overrepresented among rapidly evolving
genes in humans and chimps.”301 In this same study on “Initial Sequence of the
Chimpanzee Genome and Comparison with the Human Genome,” the authors of the
Consortium find that “the patterns of evolution in human and chimpanzee protein-coding
genes are highly correlated and dominated by the fixation of neutral and slightly deleterious
alleles.”302 They also “use the chimpanzee genome as an outgroup to investigate human
population genetics and identify signatures of selective sweeps in recent human
evolution.”303 The comparison of human and chimpanzee genomes have permitted a
closer examination of regions of the human genome that may reflect adaptive evolution.
“Within these regions, a number of loci of biological importance were identified,
including ones involved in pigmentation pathways, components of the dystrophin
protein complex,”304 and also “clusters of olfactory receptors, genes involved in nervous
systems development and function, immune system genes, and heat shock genes.”305
Despite the various biological changes between humans and chimpanzees, Clark et al.,
in ‘‘Inferring Nonneutral Evolution from Human-Chimp-Mouse Orthologous Gene Trios,”
demonstrate that “based on the comparison of genomic data, human and chimpanzee

300

Chen and Li, 444.
Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, “Initial Sequence of the Chimpanzee Genome and
Comparison with the Human Genome,” Nature 437 (Sep 2005): 69-87.
302
Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis Consortium, 69.
303
Ibid.
304
Schurr, 64.
305
Ibid., 64.
301

85

gene sequences are nearly 96% identical, implying close phylogenetic links between
them.306
2.4. The key genetic adaptations for similarities and divergencies
In his exploration of the relationship of some key genetic adaptations in the
hominin lineage to anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics, Schurr
noted that the olfactory, bipedalism, dietary changes, linguistic, encephalization, sexual,
etc. genes help for the observation of genetic adaptation. About the olfactory genes, he
notes that those genes have undergone very rapid change in the chimpanzee and human
lineage.307 Even Chen and Li estimate that there are about 50 genes linked to smell which
have shown evidence of positive selection.308 The olfactory receptors (OR) as the genes
with the sense of smell were known to undergo rapid divergence in primates. These
differences probably reflect the reduced importance of smell in the human lifestyle
relative to that of chimpanzees. One of the key human adaptations is bipedalism, which
is a defining feature of the hominin clade. Bipedalism is marked by a series of skeletonmuscular, neurological, postural, and developmental changes that permit habitual
movement and balance on two legs. Bipedalism supposes also some anatomical changes
like pelvic structure, angled knees, curved lumbar region, and reorientation of muscle
attachments, among others.309 Comparative genomic study has indicated that certain
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selective changes may have occurred in genes that influenced the evolution of
bipedalism. And these selective changes include long-bone growth, hair loss, actin
binding, and cytoskeletal formation.310

3.Human bipedality and ape anatomy. A comparison of
gorilla and human anatomy and stature. (From Bernard G.
Campbell et al., Humankind Emerging, 9th ed., 2006, Fig.
13.16.) From Theodore G. Schurr, Fig. 2.7

The emergence of bipedalism is explained in two different ways. With the fossil
evidence, it seems that Sahelanthropus could be the first bipedal. Fossil femora discovered
in the Lukeino Formation of Kenya and attributed to Orrorin tugenensis provides the
earliest postcranial evidence of hominin bipedalism at 6 mya. But there has been a debate
about the functional and phylogenetic significance of these femora. There is even an article
by Brian G. Richmond and William J. Jungers in 2008, “Orrorin tugenensis Femoral
Morphology and Evolution of Hominin Bipedalism,” which shows that the Orrorin
tugenensis311 has a different femur from those of apes and Homo, and his femur seems to
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resemble those of Australopithecus and Paranthropus. From the comparative
biomechanical anatomy of Orrorin tugenensis, it seems for some scholars that the Orrorin
tugenensis was adapted to bipedalism. But there was some evidence that an
Australopithecus was bipedal. However, truly obligate bipedalism apparently did not arise
until the emergence of Homo erectus. Bipedalism seems to have “an important influence
on the development of human cognitive abilities.”312 And the “shift from a quadrupedal
to a bipedal locomotory adaptation led to a major transformation of hominins at
anatomical, behavioral, cognitive, and physiological levels.”313
The comparison of the human and chimp genomes has also shown that almost 80
genes used to digest proteins differ between these two species.314 “These differences
likely reflect how the human diet has changed in the 5 million years since hominins split
from chimpanzees.” 315 Like the transformation from quadrupedalism to bipedalism, the
hominin digestive system underwent major transformation to adapt itself to the new diet.
According to Leslie Aiello and Peter Wheeler in “The Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis: The
Brain and the Digestive System in Human and Primate Evolution,” and Katharine Milton
in “Hypothesis to Explain the Role of Meat-eating in Human Evolution,” Chimps (and
most probably early hominins) have a longer large intestine and a shorter small intestine,
as needed by an omnivorous species with a significant intake of vegetative matter and
fibrous food sources.316 By contrast, humans have the opposite configuration, a shorter
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large intestine and longer small intestine, allowing them to absorb more nutrients,
minerals, and fats in the food sources that they consume.317 This remodeling of the body
had significant bioenergetic implications, as both the brain and the stomach are
metabolically costly organs. It is said that overall, Homo erectus exhibits features more
like those of modern humans than those of earlier “and contemporaneous
australopithecines and paranthropines. The Homo erectus and modern human seem to
have in common “larger relative brain sizes, larger bodies, higher energetic needs,
obligate bipedalism, and smaller teeth and jaws.”318 In their divergence and similarity in
their diet, chimpanzees and humans had different strategies in scavenging or hunting.
Because these two activities suppose the coordination of group actions to procure food
sources, some forms of communication were necessary. The comparisons between
chimp and human scavenging and hunting practices reveal a lack of coordinated group
actions in chimps, which could be explained by the level of communication.
Indeed, the ability to communicate is another way to demonstrate the genetic
adaptation and to explain the genomic divergence and similarity between humans and
apes and chimpanzees. It has been demonstrated by Premack that “both humans and apes
are capable of learning and imitation, but only humans can clearly teach others how to
do tasks, while apes require human training to repeatedly perform imitative behaviors.”
And, “while great apes can clearly master the use of hundreds of symbols and
rudimentary grammar, humans are capable of learning a far greater vocabulary and
symbolic repertoire”319 In addition, “humans have both recursive and non-recursive
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theories of mind, and the capacity to understand recursive and non-recursive grammars,
whereas apes and monkeys are limited to non-recursive grammars.”320And, in “The
Evolution of Human Speech: Its Anatomical and Neural Bases,” Philip Lieberman notes
that speech “requires a brain that can ‘reiterate’ or freely reorder a finite set of motor
gestures to form a potentially infinite number of words and sentences.”321 According to
him, this appears to be lacking in the chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates. With
the analysis of brain anatomy and neuronal complexity, it becomes obvious that the
Broca and Wernicke 322 views of locating the abilities of language to the left hemisphere
of the brain or in the parietal lobe and temporal lobe is limited, because we “now
understand that many different parts of the brain are involved in speech production and
comprehensive and symbolic behavior.”323
The comparison of the human and chimpanzee genomes “have identified changes
in 21 human genes that are linked to hearing. Such genes not only enable humans to
understand speech in the brain, but also are involved in hearing and are likely related to
the linguistic abilities of modern humans.”324 The language or speech production relies
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also on having the appropriate anatomical features of vocal apparatus. “Humans and
apes differ considerably in the size and shape of the vocal tract, the position of the tongue
in the oral cavity, and the location of the larynx in the throat.”325 While in apes, there is
the higher position of the larynx, a longer shallower tongue and oral cavity, and the
inability to use the tongue and oral cavity to produce vowel sounds, in humans, the
tongue shape and position creates oral-to-pharyngeal proportions of the supralaryngeal
vocal tract.326

4. A comparison of chimpanzee and human vocal anatomy.
(From Bernard G. Campbell et al., Humankind Emerging, 9th
ed., 2006, Fig. 13.16.) From Theodore G. Schurr, Fig. 2.10.

One of the possibilities to explain the ontogenetic aspects of language abilities327
in humans and apes is that the human vocal ability follows a general ape trajectory until
the shift to the human track. “In this model, the human child has its larynx situated
higher in its throat like apes until 2-3 years of age, when it begins producing articulate

325

Schurr, 73.
Ibid.
327
In 2002, the Specific Language Impairment Consortium, composed by several researchers had
identified a gene that is central to the human ability to develop language, the forkhead-box P2 gene
(FOXP2) which is found in many vertebrate, and was initially identified as the genetic cause of a speech
disorder in a family in which half of the members have severe articulation difficulties accompanied by
linguistic and grammatical impairment. With the researchers of the Consortium, the FOXP2 is identified
as the regulate gene expression by binding to DNA, and it is also required for a proper development of
speech and language in humans. “The predominant features of the FOXP2 phenotype of affected
individuals were an impairment of both the selection and sequencing of fine orofacial movements
underlying fluent speech, and the linguistic processing for both spoken and written language. Cf. Schurr,
76.
326

91

speech, at which time several developmental changes take place, including the descent
of the larynx into its adult position in the throat.”328 The emergence of the human ability
to comprehend and produce semantically meaningful sounds is then marked by both
anatomical and cognitive changes.329
Another key genetic adaptation is encephalization, 330 since the size of the brain
is considered one of the primary traits of demarcation between human and apes and
between the rest of hominins. The human genome for genes related to brain growth
shows evidence of positive selection in human lineage, in the way that those genes are
viewed as potentially contributing to the emergence of modern human cognition. There
are two genes which are associated with primary microcephaly (small cerebral cortex),
the first being abnormal spindle-like microcephaly (ASPM) and the second being
microcephalin (MCPH1).331 “Microcephaly reduces the human brain to 50% or less of
its normal mass, i.e., to about the size of the brain of chimpanzees or early hominin
ancestors (and the microcephalin gene) is highly polymorphic in human populations,
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with most mutations being non-synonymous in nature.”332 The ASPM and MCPH have
undergone adaptive evolution in the hominin lineage.333
When it comes to modeling brain evolution in apes and humans, relative size
does seem to matter. It is traditionally admitted that there is a “relationship between
brain size and the complexity of hominin behavior as viewed through the lithic
production, faunal analysis, coordination of group activities, language ability, and
adaptability to numerous different environments.” 334 However, “more recent studies of
brain anatomy employing modern imaging techniques are showing that expanding brain
size is only part of the story behind the emergence of modern human cognitive function
and behavioral capacities.”335 In his analysis of brain structure sizes across the primate
order, James Rilling, in his MRI results, showed that both human and ape brains
exhibited specializations with respect to other anthropoid brains. More specifically, “ape
specializations include elaboration of the cerebellum (all apes) and frontal lobes (great
apes only), and probably connectivity between them.”336 And human brain
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from chimpanzees. The regions of the ASPM gene under positive selection in primates are also the most
highly diverged regions between primates and non-primate mammals. Therefore, current data indicate that
the ASPM gene has undergone adaptative evolution in the hominin lineage. Cf. Schurr, 80
334
Schurr, 81.
335
Ibid., 81.
336
James K. Rilling, “Human and Non-human Primate Brains: Are They Allometrically Scaled Versions of
the Same Design?” Evolutionary Anthropology 15 (Apr 2006): 65.
332

93

specializations include an overall larger proportion of neocortex, “with disproportionate
enlargement of prefrontal and temporal association cortices, an apparent increase in
cerebellar connections with cerebral cortical association areas involved in cognition, a
probable augmentation of intracortical connectivity in prefrontal cortex.”337
Until now, most studies of the emergence of language production and
comprehension have focused on genes influencing brain anatomy338 or the analysis of
cognitive and neurological phenomena, but there is a study on the masticatory muscles
in humans and primates, as well as the myosin gene which is one of the genes involved
in producing them.339 It is noted in “Myosin Gene Mutation Correlates with Anatomical
Changes in the Human Lineage,” by Hansell Stedman et al., that powerful masticatory
muscles “are found in most primates, including chimpanzees and gorillas, and were a
prominent part of the adaptative strategies of Australopithecus and Paranthropus. In
contrast, these muscles are considerably smaller in both modern and fossil members of
the genus Homo.”340 For them, according to Stedman et al., the myosin mutation
“facilitated greater encephalization in the hominin lineage due to removing
physiological and structural constraints on brain and cranial growth.”341
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By exploring the emergence of the modern human, which shows the similarities
and divergences between humans and others species, especially chimpanzees, it is
realized that “while having roots in primate and hominin prehistory, modern humans
have undergone significant biological and behavioral changes over the last 2 million
years.”342 Comparing the human genome to those of the chimpanzees, gorillas, and other
primate species, it is showed that the human genome has undergone profound changes
in terms of its size, content, and regulation.
Despite the close genetic affinity between apes and humans, such that these taxa
share over 96% of their genomic sequences, it is evident that “there are significant
differences in the expression and regulation of these genes in the two species, as well as
specific allelic and chromosomal changes (e.g., segmental duplications) that led to the
phenotypic, physiological, and behavioral differences seen in them.”343 The differences
are even observable in the way that each lineage (humans and apes) was affected by
selection, which had implications for the cultural and even the sexual lives of each of
these species. Schurr illuminated the cognitive difference between apes and humans, and
the evolutionary forces that have influenced them. The size of brain is clearly one feature
that distinguishes humans from apes, but it is, according to Schurr, one dimension of the
transformation of the hominid brain, because some others dimensions have also been
observed, like the cortical areas which are related to higher cognitive function, the
neuronal density and the neuroanatomical architecture. 344 And as he states, “it is clear
that the hominin brain has been transformed in a manner that now allows us to have

342

Schurr, 87.
Ibid.
344
Ibid.
343

95

articulate speech, abstract reasoning, and complex cultural behavior in contrast to other
hominoid apes.”345
Until now, it is difficult to determine the exact timing of the emergence of the
genus Homo in the Pliocene-Pleistocene boundary and the timing of most of the
transition which remain speculative. And the conditions “under which the
transformation of the genus Homo took place – which shaped the evolution of the species
or lineage – are still incompletely understood.”346 The hypothesis is that there could have
been major climate changes which might have triggered a shift in subsistence towards
broader spectrum diet and greater consumption of meat, and accompanying behavior
changes like hunting and scavenging. This dietary shift led to the transformation in gut
morphology of hominids, “setting the biological foundation for the later encephalization
of the lineage, and perhaps also the bioenergetic basis for more hominin-like forms of
bipedalism, which permitted the expansion of the lineage outside of its Africa
homeland.”347 There are still also questions about the timing of the emergence of modern
human language,348 the selective forces that promoted rapid brain size growth, and the
relationship between brain size and complexity and primate and hominin linguistic and
cultural abilities.
Terrance Deacon, who could be associated with the integrative evolution, not
only because of his integrative works of neuroscience with evolutionary biology while
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he was investigating the human cognition, but also because of the close connection of
his symbolic representation with the inter-relation of the biological and cultural
evolution of Merlin Donald, makes some important contributions on the development of
language in human beings. With The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language
and the Brain, he offers a wealth of insights into the significance of symbolic thinking,
from the co-evolutionary exchange between language and brains over the two million
years of hominid evolution to the ethical repercussions that followed man’s newfound
access to other people’s thoughts and emotions. Like many of those who were interested
in the question of language, Deacon was intrigued by what makes the human brain
capable of speech, and by the reasons why animals don’t have such language. The
exclusivity of the ability for language in the human species is explained ultimately by
the capacity of symbolization, which is lacking in all the rest of the species. From his
argumentation, what makes language unique and special for humans is the fact that it
uses symbols or symbolic reference. While emphasizing the symbolic threshold (iconindex-symbol),349 Deacon states,
(The) referential relationship between the words—words systematically
indicating other words—forms a system of higher-order relationship that allows
words to be about indexical relationships, and not just indices in themselves. But
this is also why words need to be in context with other words, in phrases and
sentences, in order to have any determinate reference. Their indexical power is
distributed, so to speak, in the relationships between words. Symbolic reference
derives from combinational possibility and impossibilities, and we therefore
depend on combinations both to discover it (during learning) and to make use of
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it (during communication). Thus, the imagined version of a nonhuman animal
language that is made up of isolated words, but lacking regularities that govern
possible combinations, is ultimately a contradiction in terms.350
He rejects the traditional approach of complexity, which could make human
language unique.351 Against the approach of Noam Chomsky of a universal grammar
encoded in our brains, i.e., an ‘innate grammar’ which could explain why humans could
learn complex language, Deacon argues that it is language itself which provides the
facility for the emergence of language. And, the prefrontal cortex, which is more
developed in humans than in apes and all other species, is the part of the brain which is
responsible for symbolic reference or symbol formation. In other words, the capacity for
‘symbolic reference’ is made possible by the fact that humans have the prefrontal cortex
which is larger than the one of chimpanzees. He argues considerably about the
localization of the speech function within the brain and has rejected Broca and
Wernicke’s views of locating the abilities of language in the left hemisphere of the brain
or in the parietal lobe and temporal lobe. It is clear for Deacon also that the ability to
use a symbolic reference requires not only the prefrontal cortex, but also the vocal tract
and the lower position of the larynx in the human throat when compared to the one of
apes or chimpanzees. Indeed, it is because of that lower position of the human larynx
that humans can produce sounds and are able to choke when they swallow something.
Deacon has also argued about the influence of symbolic reference during the
evolution of the modern human. According to him, the Neanderthals were able to use
the symbolic reference. Before that, like in the case of the Homo erectus, there is no
assurance that they used symbolic communication. And without demonstrating it, he
350
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believes that the demise of the Neanderthals was not due to a cultural or linguistic
inferiority, but it was due to disease.352 From Deacon’s contribution, the symbolic
reference and the prefrontal cortex, but also the vocal tract and the lower position of the
larynx, are majors elements which explain how human language is unique and special,
and why animals don’t have language.
2.5. Epistemic evolution
Jürgen Renn presents a new way to approach the history of science and
technology, the history of knowledge. The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science
for the Anthropocene353 and in the article “The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking
Science in the Anthropocene,”354 this new approach offers a grand narrative of human
history where knowledge serves as a critical factor of cultural evolution. He argues that
humanity has entered into a new stage of evolution, 355 the stage of epistemic evolution.
Just as the cultural evolution emerged from the biological evolution, he believes that
epistemic evolution emerged as an aspect of cultural evolution and now dominates the
global fate of humanity. It is characterized by the increasing dependence of global
society on the achievements and further extension of science and technology in order to
ensure its sustainability in the age of the Anthropocene. 356
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Renn examines the role of knowledge in global transformations going back to
the dawn of civilization, while providing vital perspectives on the complex challenges
confronting us today in the Anthropocene – “the new geological epoch of humankind
[..] (and) the ultimate context for a history of knowledge and the natural vanishing point
for an investigation of cultural evolution.”357 This book is an examination of the possible
role of the history of science in understanding the Anthropocene, in the way that it
reframes the history of science and technology within a much broader history of
knowledge. He reframes this history by analyzing key episodes such as the evolution of
writing, the emergence of science in the ancient world, the Scientific Revolution of early
modernity, the globalization of knowledge, industrialization, and the profound
transformations wrought by modern science. He investigates the evolution of knowledge
using an array of disciplines and methods, from cognitive science and experimental
psychology to earth science and evolutionary biology. With his cultural evolutionary
approach, he emphasizes the evolution of knowledge and its transformation. The result
is an entirely new framework for understanding structural changes in systems of
knowledge and a bold new approach to the history and philosophy of science.
Renn structures his reflection in five parts. In part 1, he argues about the double
character of knowledge, the empowerment it provides, and the unintended consequences

Earth system. He told the delegates to stop using the term “Holocene” and, while speaking, searched for a
better one. “We are not in the Holocene anymore. We are in the…the… the Anthropocene.” The Holocene
was described as the second period of so-called Quaternary period, after the Pleistocene, which is an Ice Age
that began 2.6 mya, while the Holocene is interglacial period in which the ice retreats. The Holocene began
11,700 years before 2,000 CE, and its climatic conditions have been unusually stable ever since. The term
‘Anthropocene’ has been used by the limnologist Eugene F. Stoermer since the 1980 And as Renn notes in
his article, the concept of Anthropocene has opened our eyes towards a fundamentally altered global
environment and the fact that humanity has meanwhile changed the planet to a degree comparable to geologic
forces. Cf. Renn, The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene, 5.
357
Renn, The Evolution of Knowledge: Rethinking Science for the Anthropocene, ix.

100

to which it leads. In part 2, he argues about the historical nature of thinking and the
structural changes of knowledge. He dedicates part 3 to the “economy of knowledge”
by investigating how knowledge structures affect society and how society affects
knowledge structures. In part 4, he focuses on the globalization processes of knowledge,
asking how knowledge spreads. And finally, in part 5, he argues about the kind of
knowledge our future depends. Recapitulating the role of knowledge in and for
Anthropocene, Renn states
Humans have massively intervened in various Earth system cycles, such as the
carbon cycle, causing climate change, as well as the water, nitrogen, phosphorus
and sulphur cycles, all of which are fundamental to life on Earth. Humanity has
affected the energy balance at the Earth’s surface, resulting in the transition of our
planet into a new stage, the Anthropocene, propelled and empowered by the
knowledge embodied in our technologies and our material culture. The question of
whether and when the Anthropocene began is still debated. What is clear is that this
knowledge has accumulated over generations and ever more quickly since the
Scientific Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the so-called Great
Acceleration of the 1950s.358
In the 5th part, when he returns to the relation between the Anthropocene and the
evolution of knowledge, Renn begins by clarifying that cultural evolution is what
distinguishes humanity from the rest of the biosphere. Cultural evolution is a unique
layer of metabolism and learning on top of biological evolution. With their rapidly
evolving culture, humans have introduced an ‘ergosphere’ “(a sphere of work, as well as
of technological and energetic transformations) as a new global component of the Earth
system, in addition to the lithosphere, the hydrosphere, the atmosphere, and the biosphere,
thus changing the overall dynamics of the system.”359 And, “ergosphere may be on its
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way to becoming a “technosphere” in which technological and other global
infrastructures created by humans assume a self-organizing, quasi-autonomous
character.”360 In chapter 15, “Exodus from Holocene,” he argues that the entry into a
new state of the Earth system is not due to a single cause and cannot be tied to a particular
event in human history. It can best be described in terms of a cascade of evolutionary
processes, as a transition from cultural to epistemic evolution.
In cultural evolution, human societies have entered what Marx refers to as
“relations of production” dependent on their material culture. In epistemic
evolution, human societies’ interactions with the Earth system have become
dependent on science-based technologies, such as the use of fossil fuels, nuclear
power, artificial fertilizers, and genetic engineering. Without the empowerment
of the means of production through scientific knowledge, humanity would not
have entered the Great Acceleration of the 1950s that is now being discussed in
the geological sense as the beginning of the Anthropocene. 361
What stone tools, hunting, gathering, and later food production, clothing, and the
building of shelters were for the Holocene, science362 and technology are for the
Anthropocene. These two are now essential conditions of human life. The transition
from cultural to epistemic evolution is based on the development of knowledge.
360
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“Understanding the dynamics of knowledge is therefore crucial for our survival in the
Anthropocene. Both knowledge and changes in the environment accumulate across
generations in long-term processes, and not necessarily in such a way that human
survival is guaranteed.”363 As Renn developed in chapter 14 on “Epistemic Evolution,”
In the transition from biological to cultural evolution, the role of ‘niche
construction’ has been transformed from one among several aspects of biological
evolution into an essential feature of cultural evolution, as the role of material
culture and tool use for the very emergence of modern humans illustrates. In the
transition from cultural to epistemic evolution, the role of scientific knowledge
has been similarly turned from an aspect into a characteristic feature of novel
evolutionary dynamics.364
“In cultural evolution, the internalization and reproduction of given external
conditions within societal development was largely a matter of circumstance. In
epistemic evolution, it will have to become more and more a matter of knowledge.”365
The awareness that we are living in the Anthropocene does not concern only politics and
economics but also the quest for more knowledge that may trigger cross-scale effects on
social behavior. And in chapter 16, “Knowledge for the Anthropocene,” Renn argues
that the internet offers, at least in principle, a knowledge economy toward a global
coproduction of knowledge and new forms of organizing, integrating, locally adapting,
and implementing scientific knowledge. A future Web of Knowledge or an Epistemic
Web which would help to balance asymmetries in the ownership and control of
knowledge and allow users to become ‘prosumers,’ for instance by replacing browsers
with interfaces optimized for interacting with global human knowledge as represented
on the Web. Not only content but also the network of links would have to become an
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openly accessible public good. However, before getting to epistemic evolution, human
species has to evolve to be anatomical modern humans (AMH).
Conclusion
In this chapter on the evolutionary contribution to our understanding of the
emergence of the modern humans, we have developed three stages of evolutionary
theory: biological, cultural, and epistemic evolution. By evolutionary contribution, we
mean not only biological evolution or evolutionary science. Rather we have extended
our analysis to the cultural and epistemic evolution. We have even dealt with the
emergence of the anatomical modern humans which helps us to address the similarities
and divergences between humans and nonhumans starting from chimpanzees and great
apes. From the biological to the cultural and finally to epistemic evolution, there is a
reciprocity which is demonstrated in the integrative evolution which we have developed
in the course of this second chapter.
In general, evolutionary theory challenges the traditional understanding of the
species as having been created in a fixed way and separate from each other. As part of
biological evolution, Darwin’s theory, with its descent with modification model,
challenges the theory of fixity, and with its natural selection in relation to the principles
of variation, multiplicity, and heredity, opened the window to the new understanding of
human beings as a species which shares the same common ancestor with other species.
Human uniqueness could no longer be based on a certain fixity or separation from other
species. Then, Neo-Darwinism, which synthesized Darwin’s theory in relation with
molecular biology, natural selection, and modern population genetics, showed that there
is more evidence of the similarities between human beings and other species. The
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scientific contribution of the DNA molecules has shown the similarities between the
molecular structure of similar proteins in different species.
During the contemporary period, there have been vast contributions to the
biological evolutionary science which have added to the explanation of the emergence
of the modern humans. The Social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer advocated for a societal
system which is subject to the Darwinian laws of natural selection; the Eugenics Movement
of Francis Galton considered that humanity could be improved through selective breeding;
the Sociobiology of Edward O. Wilson developed a scientific study of the biological
aspects of social behavior in animals and humans. The Evolutionary psychology of Jerome
Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby developed an approach to psychology in which
knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research on the
structure of the human mind. For the evolutionary psychologists, all human behaviours
reflect the influence of psychological and physical predispositions that helped human
ancestors survive and reproduce.
In addition to the biological evolution, we emphasized the cultural evolution which
recognizes cultural patterns in great apes and chimpanzees. We emphasized also the
integrative evolution where an inclusive approach has been used by evolutionists in their
explanation of human cognitive and cultural evolution. In the integrative evolution, we
analyzed the evolution of human cognitive capacity where the theoretic culture, the
superplastic brain, and complex webs of culture, which correspond to the symbolization of
Deacon, are what distinguish modern humans from nonhumans.
It was in that context of cultural evolution contributions that we focused on the
question of the emergence of the modern human, where we, acknowledging the real
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divergence of human beings from other species, recognized also that we have more in
common with chimpanzees and bonobos than how we diverge from them. Even if apes
don’t have complex languages or symbolic language, we recognized in them the use of
incipient languages, the capacity to comprehend and communicate various emotions. We
also recognized in most ape species the use of tools, which indicates their use of the brain
and strategic planning. We also recognized in chimpanzees and orangs the cultural patterns
in more or less thirty different behaviors, including anting, greeting gestures, and
reconciliation.
The use of language, the presence of culture, tool-use, brain size, and even
bipedalism, which were seen as unique and exclusive traits which differentiate modern
humans from other primate species, are now understood to be elaborations of similar
features in other species, although with some specific manifestations for modern humans.
Keeping in mind that the genomic sequences of humans and chimpanzees, for example, are
96% identical, modern humans are not then unique or exclusive simply because they have
language, culture, tool use, and larger brain size. These common features among humans
and primates diminish the assertion of modern human uniqueness, despite clear
quantitative differences between Homo sapiens and other primate species.
At the end of this chapter, we have analyzed the epistemic evolution which,
according to Jürgen Renn, is based on knowledge. From the cultural evolution, humanity
has entered into the epistemic evolution stage which is characterized by the increasing
dependence of global society on the achievements and further extension of science and
technology in order to ensure its sustainability in the age of the Anthropocene. Just as
the cultural evolution emerged from the biological evolution, the epistemic evolution

106

emerged from the cultural evolution. This epistemic evolution, like the capacity for
symbolization according to Deacon, is understood to belong only to modern humans.
Ultimately, we have demonstrated in this chapter that, in the analysis of the emergence of
the modern anatomical human, despite the divergencies between species, there are more
similarities between human species and nonhuman species, starting with the chimpanzees,
bonobos and great apes than there are difference which would isolate the human species.
To date, we have demonstrated that the content of the notion of imago Dei has been
influenced by historical circumstances and changing conceptual frameworks, which is the
justification for our proposal for further conceptual development. This chapter has
provided the contemporary scientific date for guiding that further development. The
following chapter will present our constructive proposal for that development.
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CHAPTER III: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL: EXTENSION OF
IMAGO DEI TO OTHER SPECIES AS A NEW APPROACH TO
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.
As Israel holds a place of honor among the races, so humans
occupy a place of honor among the non-human beings
(including animals and angels). However, as “the election of
Israel neither signaled YHWH’s renouncement of the other
nations nor involved their rejection in any way,” so the election
of humans in no way indicates God’s rejection or lack of concern
for non-human creatures.366
Introduction
Reflecting on the various understandings of the notion of imago Dei in the first
chapter, it emerged that all the definitions were built on the assertion that human beings
are unique and exclusive among other species. Because of their belief in being created as
fully different entities, separated from other species from the beginning, human beings
identified themselves as the only imago Dei. When this uniqueness or exclusiveness is not
explained by being the chosen of God, it is explained by having a soul or the intellectual
ability to reason while other species lack it. With the contributions of Evolutionary science,
without denying the divergences and similarities between human beings and other species,
like chimpanzees, it is clear that human beings and other species have the same ancestor,
because everything began with the eukaryotes, the first unicellular organism, estimated
between 4 – 3.5 bya. It is also clear that as human beings, we can no longer attribute to
ourselves alone language, culture, tool use, brain size, and even bipedalism.
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With the Big Bang theory and the emerging evolutionary history of life, we
recognize not only that human beings share a common history of life with all other species,
but also that new species which existed during the evolutionary pathways depended on
what went before them, even if they represented something new. As human beings, who
share a lot with other creatures, can we continue to consider ourselves as the only imago
Dei? Are we still the masters, those responsible for or the stewards of creation? How can
we understand our care for the environment? When God allowed the Big Bang and the
emergence of the life to happen, was it not in His images that He did it?
In this third and last chapter, we will begin by emphasizing the possibility of
inclusivity of the imago Dei. We will first focus on Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common
Home, where Pope Francis challenges the notion of stewardship by encouraging the human
being as imago Dei to care for and have awareness of the importance of ethics in his/her
relationship to the environment. From there, we will emphasize the extension of imago Dei
to other species from the perspective of interrelatedness of Denis Edwards, moral capacity
of the apes of Oliver Putz, and election of the imago Dei which benefits all creation of
Joshua Moritz. By agreeing with the argument for inclusivity or openness, we will
demonstrate our view of the diversity of imago Dei, so that every species can be considered
as imago Dei in different way. And to conclude, we will affirm that every imago Dei has
purpose and value, and that, although humans emerge from the evolutionary pathways, this
does not mean that we are purposeless. Finally, we will develop our idea of the solidarity
of all creation within the concept of imago Dei.
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3.1. Imago Dei as person of care
In his encyclical, Laudato Si: On Care for Our Common Home, Pope Francis raises
awareness of the importance of ethics in our relationship to the environment. Laudato Si
also reflects considerably on the sharing of all creation in the next life. Even if the Pope
provides “an approach to ecology which respects our unique place as human beings in this
world and our relationship to our surroundings,”367 and even if he never affirms that every
creature is in the image of God, he strongly raises awareness about the rest of creation
being part of the next life. For him, it is also clear that our understanding of being stewards
because we are imago Dei is part of an “integral ecology” and should not have anything to
do with domination but should make us recognize and respect the value of other species,
as God does. From simple consumers to decision-makers to scientists, we all have an
ethical responsibility in our relationship to the environment, our common home, because
“the destruction of the human environment is extremely serious, not only because God has
entrusted the world to us men and women, but because human life is itself a gift which
must be defended from various forms of debasement.”368
The pope begins by describing many aspects of the need to take care of our
environment since its imbalance today is largely due to human abuse, selfishness, and
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human violence against it. Pollution,369 waste,370 sea-level rising,371 deficiencies of raw
materials such as water,372 the consequences of certain technological innovations or
technocracy, loss of biodiversity,373 and global warming due to the emission of greenhouse
gases374 such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrogen oxide, etc., are the responsibility of
humans. Because of that, “Humanity is called to recognize the need for changes of lifestyle,
production and consumption, in order to combat this warming or at least the human causes
which produce or aggravate it.”375 It is time to stop considering the rest of creation as
“potential resources to be exploited, while overlooking the fact that they have value in
themselves.”376

Some forms of pollution are part of people’s daily experience. Exposure to atmospheric pollutants
produces a broad spectrum of health hazards, especially for the poor, and causes millions of premature deaths.
People take sick, for example, from breathing high levels of smoke from fuels used in cooking or heating.
There is also pollution that affects everyone, caused by transport, industrial fumes, substances which
contribute to the acidification of soil and water, fertilizers, insecticides, fungicides, herbicides and agrotoxins
in general. In Laudato SI, 20.
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To that assessment of the damage done to the environment Francis proposes “A
Gospel of Creation,” that in Christian morality, taking care of the environment is an
obligation for every Christian because the environment has been created, and entrusted to
man to promote his good and not for him to dominate it. We are called to stewardship
instead of domination. As Francis states, “if the simple fact of being human moves people
to care for the environment of which they are a part, Christians in their turn realize that
their responsibility within creation, and their duty towards nature and the Creator, are an
essential part of their faith.”377 We therefore have a moral obligation according to Christian
doctrine to cultivate, work, safeguard, preserve, and, above all, care for our environment.
This is what our Creator prescribes for us. Caring for God’s creation means that “human
beings, endowed with intelligence, must respect the laws of nature and the delicate
equilibria existing between the creatures of this world.”378 By caring for the rest of creation,
Francis is calling us “to recognize that other living beings have a value of their own in
God’s eyes.”379
Pope Francis stresses the human roots of the ecological crisis, “the dominant
technocratic paradigm and the place of human beings and of human action in the world.”380
Francis calls for the wise way to use the power that scientific knowledge is giving to human
beings, so that that scientific power will not be used to kill other human beings. In that use
of power, it is important to consider the importance of the inalienable value of the human
being which goes beyond his search for progress.381 Caring for the earth as imago Dei
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presupposes that humans should be ethical, demonstrate wisdom in the use of technological
power, and seek a conversion in our relationship between every imago Dei.
Pope Francis proposes a revised way of thinking of our relation to creation, an
“Integral ecology” which draws attention to the entirety of ecology; Human beings must
stop thinking of themselves as being separate from the rest of creation because today
everything is closely interrelated. Our inclusion in nature obliges us to take care of it and
preserve it for future generations because it is a gift from our God. Integral ecology
considers the human, family, work, urban contexts and the relationship of each person with
himself and his relationship with others and the environment. Respect for the environment
also means accepting oneself as being created. “The acceptance of our bodies as God’s gift
is vital for welcoming and accepting the entire world as a gift from the Father and our
common home, whereas thinking that we enjoy absolute power over our own bodies turns,
often subtly, into thinking that we enjoy absolute power over creation.”382 We necessarily
need to accept ourselves as created beings, otherwise the tendency will be to dominate the
environment around us, as if we were the creators. We certainly continue the creation, but
we are not the creators.
As a resolution, Francis proposes some lines of orientation and action in the face of
the environmental imbalance caused by human action which affect the way we imagine
ourselves. It is important that as people made in the image of God we engage in a “dialogue
which can help us to escape the spiral of self-destruction which currently engulfs us.”383 It
is important to put in place global regulatory norms “to impose obligations and prevent
unacceptable actions, for example, when powerful companies or countries dump
382
383

Laudato Si, 155.
Ibid., 163.

113

contaminated waste or offshore polluting industries in other countries.”384 It is urgent to
make ethical decisions based on solidarity and transparency in decision-making to regulate
all the causes of this environmental imbalance, but these decisions must be carefully
studied so as not to cause other international injustices. The solutions advocated by the
Holy Father call for the solidarity and generosity of decision-makers, and, also for a culture
of values, so that we can facilitate the continued creation of the Creator and leave future
generations a more dignified environment, which will restore as much as possible harmony
between God, man, and the earth.
Emphasizing an “ecological education and spirituality” in the six and last chapter,
Pope Francis insists on the awareness that we must have of our common origin, our mutual
belonging and the sharing of a common future. Even if Pope Francis did not extend the
idea of being made in the image of God to the rest of creation, he insists on the idea of our
communal destiny with all the rest of creation. This commonality is the sign that creation
has meaning in the eyes of God. We, human beings as imago Dei, are called to “discover
the action of God in the soul, but also to discover God in all things.”385
If God did not make all the creation in his image, in whose image did He make it?
In whose image does He allow then the first unicellular and the rest of the species during
the evolutionary pathways to exist? But by making the rest of creation in his image, does
He remove something from human beings as imago Dei? And if God can express Himself
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in different ways, can God not create things in His image in different ways? God as the
Trinity expresses Himself in different ways.
The Father is the ultimate source of everything, the loving and selfcommunicating foundation of all that exists. The Son, his reflection, through
whom all things were created, united himself to this earth when he was formed
in the womb of Mary. The Spirit, infinite bond of love, is intimately present at
the very heart of the universe, inspiring and bringing new pathways.386
By creating, God expresses Himself in different ways in creation. In different ways,
He could make all creation in His image. Francis seems to affirm this when he states that
“In union with all creatures, we journey through this land seeking God.”387 We are all
“journeying towards the Sabbath of eternity, the new Jerusalem, towards our common
home in heaven.”388 The conviction that all the creation is journeying towards the new
Jerusalem is the reason why we found important the contribution of this encyclical Laudato
Si of Pope Francis to the idea of applying imago Dei to other species. By insisting on the
fact that all the creation is journeying together, Pope Francis helps our understanding of
similarities between human beings and the rest of the creation. Additionally, Francis holds
the conviction that stewardship does not have anything to do with taking advantage of
creation, instead stewardship is adopting an integral ecology where human beings in their
care for the rest of creation respect and recognize the value of other species, as God does.
It is necessary, as Pope Francis proposes, to move toward a reconciliation between
humanity and the environment.
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3.2. Extension of imago Dei to other species from the perspectives of Denis
Edwards, Oliver Putz, and Joshua Moritz
3.2.1. Imago Dei as interrelated to another imago Dei
Denis Edwards offers a reflection on ecology from a Christian view. 389 From the
necessity of ecological conversion390 and of a new perspective on Christian ecology,391
Edwards emphasizes what it means to be human in the midst of creation, and then moves
to the experience of spirit, before turning explicitly to consider the place of Jesus in
ecological theology, which opens to the ecological theology of the Trinity, which leads to
a reflection on the final transformation of all things in Christ, and on worship and
practice.392 Ecological theology seems to find support from scientific cosmology and
evolutionary biology, according to Edwards. By assuming the Big Bang theory, the
stardust393 and the emerging evolutionary history of life, Edwards makes the remark that
“we human beings share a common history of life with all the other creatures of Earth. We
carry within us a story of life that goes back to our pre-human ancestors in Africa, back to
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the trilobites of the Cambrian seas, and ultimately back to the first bacterial forms of life
3.5 billion years ago.”394
Edwards addresses the question of the imago Dei, seeing it as the “foundation for a
Christian view of the radical value of each person before God. It is the basis for the
Christian commitment to equal and mutual relations between women and men.”395 But the
imago Dei in reference to human beings can become dangerous. He states, “This concept
of the human as image of God becomes dangerous when it used to set humans up in
opposition to other creatures, above all when it is used to suggest that humans have absolute
and unlimited rights over other species.”396 Against the use of the imago Dei as a
destructive distortion, Edwards proposes that “it is possible to retrieve this powerful
biblical idea in an ecological theology that situates human beings in relationship to other
creatures, and that understands each creature as in its own way reflecting and imaging
God.”397
Using the same logic, Edwards remarks that “while the Bible and the Christian
tradition use the language of image of God specifically of the human, they also see the
whole of creation, and the diversity of life on Earth, as the self-expression of God and, in
this sense, as imaging God.”398 In addition, he affirms that “an eagle in flight, a wildflower
in its delicate beauty, an ecosystem, and the biosphere of Earth can each in its own way be
seen as a self-expression of the Creator, and thus as an image of God.”399 Here, Edwards
proposes the extension of the imago Dei to all life, because everything is the self-expression
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of God and, in this sense, is imaging God. It seems like Edwards proposes that humans and
nonhumans share the same imago Dei. And he believes that even Jesus as the true and
perfect image of God in his universal meaning is not just image of God “for human beings
but for all creatures. In him the reconciliation of all things has begun.”400
Despite this universal role of Christ which is unanimous among Christian
theologians, “the Christian community has usually used the image language for human
beings to bring out the uniqueness of humans before God.”401 Instead of defining the imago
Dei by one aspect of humankind like the capacity for reason, or free will or selfconsciousness,402 Edwards claims that “what makes us unique before God is not any one
capacity we possess or any partial aspect of the human.”403 For him, “it is the whole human
being understood as personal and as interpersonal. Being created as the imago Dei means
that God creates human beings as persons in order to embrace them in interpersonal
love.”404 It is clear for Edwards that “human beings are made in the image of God in the
sense that they are made for interpersonal love.”405
Additionally, the human being as imago Dei is invited to care for and to respect the
distinctiveness and otherness of the rest of creation. But if the whole creation shares the
same imago Dei, someone can ask why human beings should care for the rest of creation?
However, Edwards explains the necessity for human beings to care for the rest of creation
by the fact that the precise specificity of human beings, which is personal and interpersonal,
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makes human beings relate to other creatures as God does. “While all creatures are held in
the creative love of God at every moment, human beings are embraced by this love in an
interpersonal way. They are creation come to personhood, and as persons they can thank
and praise God on behalf of the rest of creation.”406 It is then because of this specificity of
personal and interpersonal love that human beings are called to love and respect the Earth
as God loves it.
Concerning the relationship between human beings and the rest of creation,
Edwards enumerates five models (kinship with creation;407 domination of nature;408
ecological egalitarianism;409 kinship within a community;410 and cultivating and caring for
creation411), and among them, the cultivating and caring model is the one that he supports
in his ecological theology. Instead of calling this model the functional or stewardship
model as it could be, Edwards prefers to call it the cultivating and caring for creation model,
because when the stewardship model is used “to characterize the human stance before
others creatures, it can run the risk of suggesting an inflated view of the human as a
necessary intermediary between God and other creatures.”412 It seems that the stewardship
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model suggests that other creatures do not have their own relationship with the living God
or their own integrity. The cultivating and caring for creation model seems to allow “human
beings to see themselves as interrelated in a community of life with other creatures, a
community in which each creature has its own unique value before God.”413 With the
cultivating and caring model, human creativity stands humbly before other creatures,
respects their right to exist and to flourish, and commits itself to their conservation and
flourishing. In this model of caring, wisdom and humility from human beings are crucial,
because with them, we can recognize our finitude before the mystery of God and we will
not seek to grasp or control the rest of creation. With this model, human beings “are
intimately linked to the life-forms of our planet, and to the atmosphere, the soil, and the
oceans. Our existence is encompassed by the mystery of God revealed in all the variety of
creatures that surround us. We are part of them and they are of us.”414
Edwards emphasizes that the diversity of creatures are not only the self-expression
of God, as imaging God, but they are “part of a wider pattern of relationships in nature and
that these relationships can be understood as grounded in the Trinitarian relations of mutual
love.”415 The Trinitarian radical interrelationship is used to explain the interconnectedness
or interrelatedness of the imago Dei. As at every stage during the evolutionary process,
something new occurs. At each of these stages, the new species depend on what goes
before, even if each represents something new, and the “entities emerge in our universe in
patterns of interrelationship. Things are constituted by relationship.”416 The theological
insight that the Trinity is relational provides a basis for a relational view of the universe.
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“While science tells us that each creature exists in nested pattern of constitutive relations,
theology grounds this in the Trinitarian relationships of mutual love. Trinitarian
theologians argue that if the Creator’s being is radically relational, then this suggests
something about the nature of created reality itself.”417 The interrelatedness or
interrelationship of all creatures based on the divine communion in love makes every
creature important and supports the idea that every creature is the self-expression of God,
and in this sense has the image of God proper to their species.
Even with the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the risen Christ and which is
profoundly Trinitarian, the interrelatedness is defended. “Our Eucharist communion, our
communion with each other in Christ, is always a sharing in and a tasting of the divine
communion of the Trinity, in which all things will be transfigured and find their eternal
meaning and their true home.”418 And, “this Trinitarian communion which we share is the
source of all life on Earth; it is what enables a community of life to emerge and evolve […]
it is what will be the fulfillment of all the creatures of our planet.”419
For Christians, the moment of communion with God in the Eucharist is also the
moment of communion with all creation. “By being taken up into God, we are caught up
into God’s love for creatures of our planetary community.”420 With this communion, we
are all interconnected in the self-expression of God to all the creation. By creating, God
creates everything as the self-expression of Himself, which means everything is the image
of God, according to Edwards. But instead of agreeing with him that God creates
everything in His one own image, we think that God, who allows speciation during the
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evolutionary pathways, allows every species to have one of His specific images, so that we
can all share in our common future the fullness of God’s action in us.
3.2.2. Humans and Apes as imago Dei
Oliver Putz by admitting evolutionary biology and ethology’s suggestions that
humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality and that
nonhuman animals are recognized as a free moral agent, argues that “apes and some other
mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is
incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity.” 421 He proposes that “the concept of the
imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.”422 Putz
begins by confronting himself with the question of whether morality could have evolved
by means of natural selection, and whether species other than our own also have moral
agency. He affirms that the “answer to both questions are of enormous relevance for
theology, especially for theological anthropology.”423 As he claims, “if animals possess the
necessary and sufficient mental conditions enabling them to make moral decisions, it
means not only that they have to be considered “persons” but also that they too are created
in the image of God.”424 Putz argues that great apes are indeed capable of self-reflection
and thus of moral decision-making. Therefore, he proposes that the doctrine of imago Dei
has to be broadened to accommodate moral animals.
The ethological data relevant to animal morality is based on the phylogenetic
continuum which is “the fact that evolutionary biology on earth is a continuum extending
from the earliest organism through diverse phylogenetic branches to the great variety of
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species alive today.”425 Instead of emphasizing the differences between humans and
nonhuman animals like gorillas, bonobos and chimpanzees, Putz focus on the similarities,
like “most biologists [who] agree that humans and great apes share many behaviors.”426
Regarding animal morality, empirical evidence suggests that apes are capable of cognitive
achievements which seem to be reserved to humans. Using different intellectual sources,
Putz remarks that apes make and use tools, have culture, use plants for self-medication,
have complex emotions, are empathic, show altruistic behavior not only to conspecifics,
and great apes seem to show signs of self-cognizance and ability to employ symbolic
processes that operate on the basis of mental images rather than direct sensory-motor
phenomena.427
To the question if these capabilities constitute moral agency in non-humans, Putz
argues that the moral capacities of decision means the free capacities of choice. After
admitting that “the moral agency presupposes self-consciousness,”428 Putz clarifies that the
characteristic of self-consciousness is first and foremost “the fissure of self into reflecting
subject and reflected object.”429 And “this divisions results in an internal selfsymbolization in which the objective self symbolizes to the subjective self the undivided
self as a whole. This internal self-symbolization is the foundation for all moral judgment
because it enables free self-reflection.”430 In self-reflection, language, representation and
intentionality are important. Even if chimpanzees are not capable of symbolic or complex
language as humans are, they are capable of communication or incipient language. Apes
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and chimpanzees are involved in some altruistic behavior or empathy which is a crucial
aspect of morality. The self-recognition in the mirror by adult chimpanzees is, according
to Putz, a recognition of self and not necessarily self-consciousness. He states that,
I think the case can be made that the cognitive processes underlying mirror selfrecognition require a notion of self that goes beyond merely perceptual
consciousness. In es-sence, an animal recognizing itself in the mirror externalizes
its internal self-symbolization, in which the objective self symbolizes the self to the
subjective self and transfers it to its mirror image.431
In summary, the argument of Putz is that “moral agency presupposes selfconsciousness, comprehension, and representation, and that both observational and
empirical studies suggest strongly that apes possess these mental traits. Consequently,
empathic and altruistic behavior, but also fairness in games as observed in bonobo play,
can result from moral decision-making.”432 Every animal capable of recognizing itself in a
mirror, every animal capable of self-recognition, has, according to Putz, the capacity to
receive God’s image, because the image of God is the mode or channel of God’s selfrevelation of Godself to us, and thus to every animal capable of self-recognition. With this
view, the imago Dei, according to Putz, cannot be exclusive or unique or special to human
beings.
Against the three traditional interpretations of the imago Dei (functionalRelational-Structural) which all “insist that human beings are the only species created
special, […] capable of the divine image,”433 Putz advocates for a more inclusive
interpretation of the imago Dei because of his interpretation of “ethological data
concerning mental abilities of great apes.”434 Putz proposes clearly that “it is not humanity
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alone that is wanted by God for its own sake, but rather the diversity of self-conscious
expressions that emerge from an evolutionary process and in which the universe, to say it
with Karl Rahner comes to itself while God’s self-communication be-comes realized.”435
And sharing with the great apes the notion of imago Dei is not going to remove us human
beings from our special relationship with God nor release us from our special responsibility
toward the earth as a highly technological species. In fact, it is only “an expression of the
abundant presence and richness of God’s self-communication in the world.”436 However,
it is important to mention that the inclusion of the great apes in the imago Dei by Putz is
not extended to every living thing that God creates. Not everything in creation, according
to Putz, is made in the image of God. Also, for Putz, the imago of Dei in human beings and
in great apes is the same image of God.
3.2.3. Oneness of imago Dei for all flesh
Joshua Moritz,437 argues that doctrines of the Incarnation and Christological
doctrine should be applied to creation beyond the sphere of terrestrial human beings, and
emphasized that the imago Dei concerned all flesh because “the imago Dei is a
proclamation of truly cosmic scope declaring God’s radical solidarity with all creatures in
Christ.”438 Moritz begins his article with the question “Does the Christian message of the
incarnation—and Logos Christology in particular—rule out God’s loving concern for
creation beyond the sphere of terrestrial human beings?”439 For some space researchers,
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such as Paul Davies, “Jesus Christ is called the Savior precisely because he took on human
flesh to save humankind. He did not come to save the whales or the dolphins or the gorillas
or the chimpanzees, or even the Neanderthals, however noble or deserving those creatures
may be (or were). Jesus Christ was the savior of Homo sapiens, specifically; one planet
and one species.”440 According to Moritz, the reason why scholars like Davies believes this
is because Davies alleges that Christian theology is exclusively anthropocentric: “he wants
to show that traditional Christology would require by implication a planet-hopping Christ.
He believes that Christian theologians, to be consistent with previous commitments, must
posit the apparently absurd view that God would need to become incarnate multiple
times.”441
Moritz assesses the claim “If multiple societies of extraterrestrial intelligent beings
on exoplanets exist, we can predict that God will or already has provided a species-specific
incarnation for each planet parallel to God’s incarnation in Jesus Christ on Earth,”442and
responds that Jesus443 did not come to save only human beings on this one planet. Moritz
insists on the fact that “the Advent event, when understood within the context of Early
Jewish conceptions of the Messiah as the renewal and fulfillment of the imago Dei, is a
proclamation of truly cosmic scope declaring God’s radical solidarity with all creatures in
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Christ.”444 For him, this applies to all living creatures on Earth and elsewhere, if there be
there a living creature.
Also, the incarnation of Jesus is not only for the redemption of humanity, but rather
the redemption of all biological life, all flesh. For Moritz, “God’s creation subject to God’s
redemptive action in Jesus Christ is inclusive of all life forms here on Earth; and it includes
any and all living creatures elsewhere in our expansive universe.”445 Using the same logic,
he claims that “the one incarnation of God in Christ in Earth’s history is efficacious for all
sentient creatures wherever and whenever they live.”446
Beside the many interpretations which have sought to understand the imago Dei in
light of specific unique qualities or capacities that human beings alone possess and that
non-humans lack, Moritz emphasizes that “a close examination of the sacred texts
themselves reveals that the imago Dei is never defined according to one characteristic or a
specific collection of qualities that set humans apart from other creatures.”447 He also says
that “in the Bible, the image and likeness of God is never said to be about exceptional
capacities or traits that humans alone have which qualify them (and disqualify other
creatures) for inclusion in the imago Dei category.”448 As contemporary theologians agree
in general, the biblical narrative remains silent about any qualities of human beings which
might account for their special standing as imago Dei. It is not because of morality,
rationality, sexuality, language, technology, culture, cognitive fluidity, or possession of
immortal soul. The evolution of science helps also to realize that we share a lot of the same
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genes and that there is less than 10 percent of what we can label uniquely humans’ genes.
As for many contemporary theologians, for Moritz, the imago Dei does not refer to any
quality or capacity that human beings have and nonhuman animals lack. He disagrees with
Robert John Russell who “identified the imago Dei with rationality; and with this criterion
in mind he could attribute the imago Dei to rational creatures on other planets. In contrast
to Russell, I do not associate the imago Dei with rationality or any other similar creaturely
capacity or quality.”449
Contrary to the structural, functional or stewardship, and relational or communal
understanding of the imago Dei, Moritz views the “image and likeness of God as God’s
historical choosing or election of human beings from among the animals and setting them
apart for the sake and fulfillment of the divine purposes.”450 By viewing the imago Dei
from the early Jewish and early Christian concept of historical or biblical election, Moritz
insists on the fact that “those who are elected are not chosen because they are ‘the greatest’
or inherently more worthy than others, but rather they are elected as a result of mysterious
acts of divine love and grace.”451 Indeed, “election in the biblical understanding relates to
a people (and often a lineage) whom God has chosen in the midst of history for a special
purpose within the wider context of God’s design. This purpose of historical election is
furthermore defined not in terms of privilege (or even individual salvation), but rather for
the sake of service.”452 In other words, “within the historical biblical or Hebrew concept of
election, the choosing of people groups and representative individuals is not for their own
sake, or for the purpose of individualistic final salvation, but rather for the sake of and in

Joshua Moritz, “One Imago Dei and the Incarnation of the Eschatological Adam,” Kindle.
Ibid.
451
Ibid.
452
Ibid.
449
450

128

the service of others.”453 And the non-elect are called to be blessed in and through their
relationship with the elect. In that case, “the concept of election was never assumed to be
only for the benefit of the elect, but it was always about God’s plan for the whole world,
the elect and the non-elect alike.”454
Moritz holds, that rather being a matter of exclusivism, the historical concept of
election is inclusive and universalistic. And the horizon of the particularism of election is
universal. In fact, “the particularism of the love of God for the elected one is to be related
to the more comprehensive horizon of God’s love for all.”455 In this way, the chosen one
“is assigned a function for that wider context. He is elected in order to serve as God’s agent
in relation to a more comprehensive object of God’s love.”456 When God elects, it is to
“proclaim the righteous will of God to the nations. In this view, the election of Israel is not
an end in itself. It serves the will of God on behalf of the human race as a whole.”457 As the
election of Israel or of Abraham holds a place of honor among the races, so human beings
occupy a place of honor among the rest of the creation. However, as “the election of Israel
neither signaled YHWH’s renouncement of the other nations nor involved their rejection
in any way, so the election of humans in no way indicates God’s rejection or lack of concern
for non-human creatures.”458 For Moritz, it is without doubt that the human being, as
elected as both king and priest, bears God’s image, authority, sacredness, healing, and
atoning salvation to the whole non-human creation.
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Using the same logic, the election of Jesus seems for Moritz to bring salvation to
all those who are flesh. He states, “Jesus came to save the whales, the dolphins, the gorillas,
the chimpanzees, the Neanderthals, and even extra-terrestrial biological life. As one man
from one species on one planet is elected as the telos of the imago Dei, so the entire cosmos
is brought into God’s salvific endeavor.”459 In the same way, he stands with those who
claim that the “one incarnation of God in Christ is efficacious for all sentient creatures
wherever and whenever they live.”460
While Denis Edwards extends the notion of imago Dei to all creation because of
God’s self-expression in every creature, Oliver Putz extends imago Dei only to great apes
because of their capacity for self-reflection and moral decision-making, and Joshua Moritz
extends imago Dei to all flesh based on the election of human beings. Despite their
differences, Edwards, Putz, and Moritz each argue against the idea of imago Dei as
exclusively for human beings and against the idea of imago Dei as a proof of human
superiority over the remaining creatures. They articulated these critiques because of the
challenging contribution Evolutionary theory posed to traditional biblical literalism. With
the ecological crisis, the evolutionary establishment of similarities and divergences
between human species and apes, chimpanzees, and other species, and even because of the
debate of the possibility of extraterrestrial life, the question of the imago Dei gained some
new understandings. None of the contemporary intellectuals that we have referred to reject
the idea of imago Dei for human beings, but they extend it at some point or in some way
to other living species. For our concern, we agree with them when it is matter of extending
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the imago Dei to other living species with the idea that the many ways of self-expression
of God can be the basis for the many ways of the imago Dei in creation.
In the similarity and divergence of species during the evolutionary pathways may
reside the extension of the image of God in different ways. Every time there is similarity,
there is the image of God, and every time there is a divergence, there is an image of God
in a different way. The similarity shows, then, that both are made in the image of God,
and the divergence shows that each species is made in the image of God in different
way. And that does not mean that one species can have many images of God. Every
species has only one image of God. And that one image of God is the same for every
entity of the species, and different from every one of other species.
However, someone can offer the critique that because we are all different among
the human species, does it mean that we humans are all made in the image of God in
different ways? No, the divergence is not only being different, it is the difference of
species. The divergence is the speciation which made one initial species be separated in
two different species. So, the divergence is not just the difference, but it is the difference
at speciation level. And it is at that level that human and chimpanzees and gorilla, and
any kind of living species, is made in the image of God in a different way. The similarity
of genetic sequences, cultural patterns, use of tools, language, etc., the similarity at all
these levels makes possible the extension of the image of God to other species, starting
from Chimpanzees, bonobos and great apes. However, the divergence between the
species makes possible that each species is then imago Dei in different ways.
Another way to explain our idea of being created in the image of God in different
ways can maybe come from some specifics or unique characteristics that some
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contemporary evolutionists recognize in human beings. For example, the symbolic
reference of Terrence Deacon, which is unique to human’s language and which is lacking
in chimpanzees and the rest of creation, can demonstrate that humans and chimpanzees are
evolved as the image of God in different ways. For instance, the image of God shows up
in the presence of language in both species, but different images of God show up through
the different depths of language ability of these two species. The same can even be said
about the Epistemic evolution of Renn where he emphasizes that during the cultural
evolution, humans are already distinct from the rest of the biosphere. From that distinction,
we can see that each species of the biological evolution has evolved as the image of God
in a different way, while the human species too has evolved in his different way as the
image of God. When we say evolve, we don’t mean that the different species are not
created, we want just to insist on the fact that they evolve in the process of evolution.
Perhaps another example is the difference between knowing and knowing that one
knows (consciousness, which is the activity of mind). For instance, theology is done with
the mind, in the way that it takes into consideration the consciousness of the one who is
doing it. It is only with the mind that we realize that we are not beings unto ourselves.
In that case, the mind, which made it possible for someone to be conscious about what
he knows, is also one of the constituent elements which separates the human’s species
from the other primates’ species, because animals also do have mind but seem not be
conscious of their knowledge. This ability to know that we know is perhaps what makes
us aware that we are not our own Creator, but that we are created in the image of the one
who creates us. Other animals seemingly are conscious but not self-conscious, while the
human is both conscious and self-conscious. The similarity of having a mind is an
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indication of being made at the image of God and the difference between being able to
know and being able to know that one knows is an indication of being made a different
image of God. At this point, then, what can be said about the value and purpose of the
imago Dei?
3.3. The purpose and value of the imago Dei
When purpose is not defined as the reason for which something is done or created
or for which something exists, it is defined as the intention or the objective that someone
has when he or she is doing something. According to Merriam-Webster, purpose means
“something set up as an object or end to be attained, or a subject under discussion or an
action in course of execution or an aim to oneself.”461 Examples of purpose as the object
toward which one strives or for which something exists, an aim or a goal are many and
obvious. By writing this thesis, my purpose is to deepen my understanding of the mystery
or doctrine of imago Dei, or by being a student in the Jesuit School of Theology my purpose
is to learn more about theology. It can also happen that someone is qualified as a man of
purpose, in the sense that he is determined in his action or he strives for the resolution.
Purpose can then be a personal goal, a personal achievement which gives a person purpose
whether it be a good or bad one. However, purpose can also refer to something which goes
beyond an individual or personal goal; it can be the purpose of the clan, tribe, nation, world,
human life, or all life. From a Biblical perspective, there is a universal purpose462 of human
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life, and there is also an individual purpose463 in life. Purpose can then refer to individual
life or all human life, from the biblical perspective.464 While the individual purpose is the
purpose that God has individually for our lives, the general purpose is to know and enjoy
God, who is the terminus and telos of every life.465 Purpose then goes beyond our single
life.
From the theistic evolutionism,466 which affirms both “Christian faith and
evolutionary science as secular scientists present it,”467 the purpose, value, and direction of
the imago Dei is a divine purpose, which means the value or purpose of the imago Dei is
not located within itself but is located in God. In fact, it is Peters and Hewlett who, when

called to know and enjoy Our Creator, to witness in Him, so that other imago Dei may come to know and
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accepting the Darwinian interpretation of nature in relation to the revelation of God in Jesus
Christ, affirm as theistic evolutionists that they “will not attempt to locate purpose or
direction or even value within nature. Instead, as Christians, (they) affirm a divine purpose
for nature.”468 Recognizing purpose or value as divine means it belongs in God. To have a
divine purpose means that we are valuable and meaningful in the eyes of the creator who
opened nonbeing to be and to continue to be.
Being imago Dei is then not being purposeless, like some evolutionary
psychologists posit with their atheistic materialism (Richard Dawkins, William Provine,
Thomas Huxley, or Peter Atkins), but being imago Dei shows us that our purpose and value
are in our God, and that purpose will be revealed eschatologically.469 It is that our lives
matter in the eyes of God, and that we are worthy people with dignity. Just because we
evolved during evolutionary pathways does not mean our lives can be understood as
purposeless or mechanistic or deterministic. As imago Dei, we have purpose and our
purpose is universal and divine.
Considering the example of a long straight stick that has fallen from a tree, Peters
and Hewlett make the observation that we might not think of it immediately as possessing
an inherent purpose. But if it happens that a member of the Masai tribe in Kenya or in
Tanzania were to happen upon this stick, it might be picked up. And later, it might become
the shaft of a spear. A young Masai warrior might use it to kill his first lion and establish
his manhood. He might even keep the wooden pole for years as a remembrance. The
purpose of the fallen stick would not be found in the stick itself; rather, the Masai warrior
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will have found a purpose for that piece of wood. In the same way, when it comes to
Christian theology, purpose within the created order comes from God.470
Like in the case of the example of the stick, where the purpose is revealed at the
end, in the case of imago Dei, the purpose is fully going to be revealed in God, in whose
image we are all made in different ways. The purpose is not at the beginning, it is at the
end. “Purpose comes from what is final looking backward, not from potential lying in wait
at the beginning.”471 Peters and Hewlett state that “in fact, the Greek word for end, telos,
means ‘end’ both as final state and as purpose or goal. God has a telos for nature, even if
we can’t see it within nature. It is the future act of redemption that determines what
previous creation will have meant, and this can be discerned only eschatologically.” The
purpose is then at the end. Since the purpose is at the end, this may be the reason that
Peters, in “The Imago Dei as the End of Evolution,”472 developed the idea of human beings
becoming imago Dei at the end (terminus as conclusion and telos as goal or purpose) in
imago Christi. In that logic, the purpose for the present creation resides then in God’s
promised new creation.
In Genesis 1:31, “God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very
good,” and in Revelation 21:1, “I saw a new heaven and a new earth,” it becomes obvious
that “we do not have to limit the concept of creation to a single act back at the beginning,
back at the big bang, or back in Genesis 1. […] (we believe that) God’s creative act of
imparting an open future is an ongoing one.”473 By giving to nature the possibility for a
future, God gives it two things: openness and purpose as fulfilment. God gives openness

470

Ibid., 120.
Peters and Hewlett, Can You Believe in God and Evolution?120.
472
Peters, “The Imago Dei as the End of Evolution” 92-106.
473
Peters and Hewlett, Can You Believe in God and Evolution? 122.
471

136

in the way that creation ex nihilo is possible, so that from nonbeing the big bang could
happen and could continue (creatio continua) by the creative power by which God brought
being out of nonbeing and continues to sustain the world today. And God gives purpose in
the way that a new creation will emerge as a whole which is greater than the sum of the
parts and cannot be reduced to its parts.474 This new whole refers to the new heaven and
new earth, which will “transform, yet preserve, the entire history of cosmic creation.”475
“Where we find ourselves today is looking back to alpha, to creatio ex nihilo, and looking
forwards to omega, the new creation ex vetere, out of what has come before. The new
creation will emerge from what God’s Spirit does to the present creation.”476 It is in the
emergence of the new creation that the fulfillment of the act of creation will happen. It is
there too that resides the purpose of the current continua creatio. Peters and Hewlett
suggest “the future consummation to be the crowning conclusion of God’s act of creation.
Creation will then turn out to be a single inclusive divine act whereby what comes into
existence is perfected in its existence. God will say, as the book of Genesis predicts God
will say, ‘Behold, it is very good,’ and it will become eternally good.”477
With the awareness of having purpose and value comes openness to others and the
improvement of relationships in imago Dei. And in this context, we think that solidarity
and sincerity are among those things which allow human beings as imago Dei to improve
their relationship between themselves and with the rest of creation. Solidarity is defined
traditionally as unity or agreement of feeling or action, especially among individuals with
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a common interest, objectives, and standards.478 However, in Catholic Social Teaching,479,
solidarity is not a feeling about helping other people. Solidarity is a way of life that
recognizes that we are all brothers and sisters regardless of race, creed, or ethnic
background. And with the global crisis of Coronavirus that we are facing in the world right
now, it is clear that every imago Dei is in this journey of life together.
When we say that we are in this journey together, we really mean all because a very
recent article indicated to us that, “Coronavirus could be catastrophic for Great apes,
experts warn,”480. As Saplakoglu wrote in his article, “Great apes are our closest relatives,
and the species that make up this group — including bonobos, gorillas, orangutans and
chimpanzees — are endangered. Though we don't share the same language or society, we
share about 98% of our DNA with chimpanzees. And, it seems, we have another
unfortunate similarity: our susceptibility to the same respiratory illnesses.”481 Because of
the similarities between these unfortunate species and human species, they are also at risk
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to be contaminated, and so the expert warns us so that it does not happen. No matter how
we want to emphasize our differences, we are all together in this life, all together in this
journey. Living in solidarity and sincerity is definitely the way that we are supposed to
relate to each other, because every creature is interconnected. And this solidarity does not
have anything to do with pity or charity. Like in the case of poor people most of the time,
what they need is not pity or charity but justice, a system which is just and people who live
in justice. Solidarity and sincerity among imago Dei is not then an act of pity or charity
that some fortunate ones will do in favor of other unfortunate imago Dei, but solidarity is
a right that all imago Dei deserve.
In paragraphs 1939 to 1942, The Catechism of the Catholic Church develops the
idea of solidarity as part of the Church’s social teaching. Quoting Pope Pius XII, it states
that “An error, today abundantly widespread, is disregard for the law of human solidarity
and charity, dictated and imposed both by our common origin and by the equality in rational
nature of all men, whatever nation they belong to. This law is sealed by the sacrifice of
redemption offered by Jesus Christ on the altar of the Cross to his heavenly Father, on
behalf of sinful humanity.”482 There are also other official Catholic documents483 which
emphasize solidarity, documents like Rerum Novarum484 by Pope Leo XII in 1891,
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Quadragesimo Anno485 by Pius XI in 1931, Mater et Magistra486 by John XXIII in 1961,
Populorum Progressio487 by Paul VI in 1967, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis488 by John Paul II in
1987, Deus Caritas Est489 and Caritatis in Veritate490 by Benedict XVI in 2005 and 2009,

Pius XI begins Quadragesimo Anno by honoring and summarizing Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (1891).
He writes that Rerum Novarum had encouraged many Christian leaders to reflect on social issues within a
Christian framework. After summarizing Rerum Novarum, Pius clarifies and updates four issues that Leo had
addressed: church authority, private property, just wages, and worker associations. Benefiting from the forty
years of discussion that had followed Rerum Novarum, Pius writes that private property has a twofold
character: individual and collective. Workers should have a right to attain private property, but the fruits of
the land ought to be distributed for the benefit of the common good. Pius’s discussion of the just distribution
of wealth provides a transition to his discussion of just wages. He indicates that many factors ought to be
considered in determining the appropriate wage for employees. He gives four considerations attention: the
needs of the worker and his family, the condition of the business, the public economic good, and the relation
of wages to those of other workers as well as the goods being sold.
486
The Pope notes the world’s global interdependence and expresses profound concern about the arms race
and the growing inequalities between rich and poor nations, noting that gains in science and technology
should not lead to economic disparity, but should instead benefit the common good. He also expresses
concern about the plight of small farmers and rural areas, calls for greater participation of workers in industry
and new forms of agricultural support, and notes that respect for culture must be emphasized in the Church’s
missionary activities. Intervention by governments is needed to address global problems, he says, but should
also respect the principle of subsidiarity (allowing the people closest to a problem to help resolve it with
social support as needed). Finally, he proposes that Christians should engage in a process of observing,
judging, and acting to put the Church’s social doctrine into practice.
487
In response to the worsening situation of the poor around the world, the Pope criticizes unjust structures
that have led to inequality and underdevelopment, including the inequalities of the market system, the effects
of colonialism, economic domination and exploitation of poor countries by rich ones, and the prioritization
of military spending and the arms race over development. Pope Paul VI challenges the nations of the world
to focus on the integral human development of the poorest nations. This type of development includes much
more than economic growth, requiring a true commitment to solidarity (the idea that we are one human
family) and genuinely human values.
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publication, the gap between developed and developing countries continued to widened in a variety of areas,
including the production and distribution of goods, hygiene, health and housing, availability of drinking
water, and working conditions (especially for women).
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form the consciences of the laity so that they can work for just ordering of society. Their political activity
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to take a stand for the common good and work for institutional change. The values of love, truth, and
solidarity, he writes, must inform all aspects of economic life, such as finance, trade, and globalization, which
must be humanized and re-oriented to the common good. Business owners, investors, and consumers all have
a role to play in guaranteeing that businesses operate to benefit the common good. Benedict XVI criticizes
modern society’s appeal to right without acknowledging corresponding duties, and he emphasizes the
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and Lumen Fidei,491 Evangelium Gaudium, and Laudato Si by Francis in 2013, 2013, and
2015, respectively.
Solidarity, according to The Catechism of the Catholic Church, “is manifested in
the first place by the distribution of goods and remuneration for work. It also presupposes
the effort for a more just social order where tensions are better able to be reduced and
conflicts more readily settled by negotiation.”492 Solidarity between the poor among
themselves, between rich and poor, between workers themselves, between employers and
employees in a business, solidarity among nations and peoples,493 and even solidarity
between imago Dei seem a solution to so many problems that our society is facing, like the
socio-economic problems, the systemic injustices of the global geopolitics and geoeconomics, and the exclusion of others because of their differences. “The virtue of
solidarity goes beyond material goods. In spreading the spiritual goods of the faith, the
Church has promoted, and often opened new paths for, the development of temporal goods
as well.”494 Solidarity helps people to see other people as people of dignity, i.e., to see other
imago Dei as imago Dei, and not just as instruments or objects to be used.495 Solidarity is
then the sentiment from the soul of the Church which impels human beings as imago Dei

to the needs of workers and immigrants and development assistance to poor countries implemented in a way
that prioritizes respect for life and the authentic human development of the person. He links concern for life
with the duty to care for creation, emphasizing environmental concerns more than in any past encyclical.
491
Pope Francis' first encyclical builds on the work of his predecessor, Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI,
completing a trilogy of encyclicals on the theological virtues-faith, hope, and love. This encyclical, "written
by four hands," intends to encourage the People of God to embrace their faith more fully. A continuation of
Pope Benedict XVI's encyclical letters on charity and hope, Lumen Fidei addresses the gift of faith that God
has extended to us and how the light of faith needs to be nourished and reinforced so that it can guide us on
our collective and individual faith journey.
492
The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1940.
493
Ibid., 1941.
494
Ibid., 1942.
495
In Kantian philosophy, there is a notable distinction between price and dignity. Something has a price
when it has a relative value. For example, the vehicle is a means of transport, it has a price. But something is
worthy, when it has value in itself. It cannot therefore be sold in compensation for anything, since it is an
end. Man being an end, he is worthy.
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to work for social conditions that are capable of offering to everyone a life worthy of
someone made in the image of God. And solidarity is not just among human beings as
imago Dei but solidarity is also between human beings and other species made also in the
image of God in a different way. At the end, solidarity calls us to be people of sincerity, so
that we can trust each other in what we think, say and do.
Conclusion
This chapter has, first of all, developed our constructive proposal which considers
the various understandings of the imago Dei in relation to the contribution of Evolutionary
science about the emergence of the anatomically modern human (AMH). We emphasized
the possible extension of the imago Dei to other species. In order to do so, we started by
exploring the care that human beings are supposed to have in regard to the rest of creation.
It is with the encyclical Laudato Si, by Pope Francis, that we addressed the question of an
“integral ecology.” Francis draws our attention to the entirety of ecology, insisting that
humans must stop thinking of themselves as being separate from the rest of creation,
because today everything is closely interrelated. He argues that our care for the rest of
nature does not have anything to do with domination. Without extending the idea of the
image of God to the rest of the creation, Pope Francis strongly raises awareness about the
rest of creation being part of the next life.
From there, we emphasized the extension of the imago Dei to other species with
the contributions of Denis Edwards, Oliver Putz, and Joshua Moritz. These three
contemporary scholars develop a theology of imago Dei which rejects the exclusivity and
particularity of imago Dei to human beings. Each one, in his own way, has proposed an
inclusivist approach of the imago Dei to non-human species. Edwards emphasizes the self-
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expression of God in creating all creation, which therefore images God. He helps to clarify
the interrelationship between human beings and the rest of creation in a cultivating and
caring way. Oliver Putz extends the notion of imago Dei to both human beings and apes
because of the capacity for empathy and morality in both. Joshua Moritz argues from his
theology of election that the human being as elected shares the grace of that election with
all nonhuman creatures, in the same way that Jesus as elected saved all flesh on earth and
outside of earth. While, we agree totally with Laudato Si’ and with the necessity of the
inclusive approach to the imago Dei, we agree also with Edwards, Putz and Moritz when
it is matter of extending the imago Dei to other living species. We think that the many ways
of self-expression of God can be the basis for the many ways of the imago Dei in Creation,
so that each species is made in the image of God in a different way. And with our
understanding of the similarities and divergences between modern humans and other
species, we proposed the idea of the imago Dei in all living species in different ways.
Because of the similarity between species, each species can be considered as made in the
image of God, and because of the divergence between species, each species is made in the
image of God in a different way.
In the last part of this third chapter, we focused on the purpose and at the very end
we talk about the sincerity of every imago Dei. We emphasized the purpose of imago Dei
because even when, with the evolutionary science, we explain how living species evolve,
that does not mean that they can only be explained scientifically. Beyond atheistic
materialism, where nature and living species are considered as purposeless, we believe that
by allowing every species to evolve, God has indicated a purpose for each one of them.
There is not only an individual and self-centered purpose but, as imago Dei, there is a
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universal and divine purpose, which is not located within the imago Dei but in the One in
whose image we are made. The divine purpose is then going to be revealed
eschatologically. Our lives do not have their entire meaning and goal in this life. Our
purpose is not yet completely known. All our individual and self-centered purposes must
not overshadow the divine purpose for which we are made in the image of God. The divine
purpose does not reside at the beginning or during the creatio continua but it resides in the
future, when Creation will then turn out to be a single inclusive divine act, and there, what
God said will then carry all its meaning, that all Creation is effectively good.
Because we are all made in the image of God and we are journeying together toward
our divine purpose, we proposed that it is wise for us to live in solidarity and sincerity.
Solidarity is not a feeling about helping other people but is a way of life that recognizes
that we are all brothers and sisters regardless of race, creed, or ethnic background. Our
differences are not bigger than our similarities. Even with other species, which are made
in the image of God in different ways, we are in this journey together. With the case of
COVID-19 (or Coronavirus) in this recent time, we all have plenty of examples to see that
human beings are all treated equally by the virus, regardless of our cultures, religions,
occupations, or financial situations. Living in solidarity and sincerity with other imago Dei,
even those which are imago Dei in different ways, seems the wisest thing that we can do
as people made in the image of God because undeniably, we are interconnected.
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General Conclusion
In conclusion, we would like to recapitulate some of the major points of the three
different chapters. We started with an analysis of the various understandings of the notion
of imago Dei in the history of Christianity, and demonstrated that the concept has had a
fluid content that depended on the social, historical, and conceptual frameworks in which
they were articulated. That provided the justification for exploring further elaboration of
the concept. We then emphasized the contributions of contemporary evolutionary science
on the emergence of the modern humans, and argued how the similarity and divergence
between modern humans and other species helped us to elaborate a proposal of an
extension of the notion of imago Dei to other species. We concluded that every species
could be recognized as made in the image of God in a different way.
We are also aware that the theological anthropological perspective explains the
human person in consideration of our faith, in light of Revelation and the Christ event. This
perspective has often been readjusted when a new scientific discovery has been made.
Because of the knowledge that our ancestors in the faith had about the human species, it
was obvious for them that the human person was created in his actual form and was very
separate from the other species. From the understanding of those times, the notion of imago
Dei could only be applied to the human person.
Therefore, for much of Christian history, being made at the image of God referred
uniquely to the human person. This was true from the biblical perspective, where the
human being as imago Dei was understood as undivided and relational, from the Eastern
patristic view where the human person could have a likeness or the image of God, from the
Western patristic and medieval view where the human person was characterized by one of
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his/her features or capacities like reason or intellectual ability, from the functional or
stewardship model where the responsibility of the imago Dei was emphasized, and from
the communal or relational approach where the human person was understood as a person
of relation. It was clear from all these perspectives that only human beings were the imago
Dei.
The knowledge that we have about ourselves can determine considerably what we
say about our being made in the image of God. The development of the new understandings
of the human species as an entity which has emerged in the process of evolutionary
pathways challenges the idea of our uniqueness in the world, which was based on our being
created separately from other species or on our capacity for having some features which
belong uniquely to the human race.
Despite challenging the idea of our uniqueness based on our being created in our
actual form and separate from other species, the evolutionary contributions, especially
consideration of the cultural and epistemic evolutions, recognize some distinctive
characteristics in modern humans, like the theoretic culture of Donald, the symbolic
reference of Deacon, and the scientific knowledge of Renn.
These distinctive characteristics or attributes, which are only for modern humans,
are also the proof of the modern humans as imago Dei in a different way than other species.
Despite the recognition of our distinction as a species because of our ability for theoretic
culture, for symbolization, and for scientific knowledge, contemporary evolutionary
science has proven the abundant similarities between humans and nonhuman species that
not only do we share a common ancestor with nonhumans animals, but also that there is a
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similarity between the genetic sequences, brains, language, culture, and tool-use of the
different species, humans and nonhuman animals.
As it is now difficult to build the notion of the imago Dei on some unique
characteristic or on our being created separately from other species, by considering our
belief in the eschatological gathering where everything will be reunited in God, and by
using the contributions of some contemporary scholars like Denis Edwards, Oliver Putz,
and Joshua Moritz, we extended the notion of the imago Dei to other species.
However, considering the divergences between species, we construed the notion of
the imago Dei in each species in a different way. Because of our similarity, every species
is imago Dei and because of our divergence, every species is imago Dei in a different way.
As we all are all created and evolved as the expression of God, we are not then without
purpose; instead, our purpose is a divine one. Having divine purpose shows that the fullness
of who we are will happen eschatologically, and therefore, living in solidarity with other
imago Dei, even those who are imago Dei in a different way, is no longer an act of pity or
charity but a right that every imago Dei has because of their inalienable value in the eyes
of the Creator.
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